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Aligning International Investment
Agreements with the Sustainable
Development Goals
LISE JOHNSON *, LISA SACHS ** & NATHAN LOBEL ***
International investment agreements (“IIAs”) provide
enforceable protections to foreign investors in order
to stimulate investment flows and therefore sustainable development. However, as understandings of both
the effectiveness of these agreements as well as the effects of investment and investment governance on sustainable development have evolved, it is not clear that
IIAs as currently designed are fit for that purpose.
This article examines the alignment of IIAs with the
2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. It develops
this examination in three ways. First, it proposes that
IIAs should be designed and evaluated with respect to
their ability to promote investments that advance sus* Lise Johnson is the Investment Law and Policy Head at the Columbia Center on
Sustainable Investment (“CCSI”). Her work at CCSI centers on analyzing investment
treaties and treaty-based investor-state arbitrations, and examining the implications those
instruments and cases have for host countries’ domestic policies and sustainable
development strategies. In addition, she concentrates on key institutional and procedural
aspects of the investment law framework, including efforts to increase transparency in and
legitimacy of investor-state dispute settlement. She has a B.A. from Yale University, a J.D.
from the University of Arizona, an LL.M. from Columbia Law School, and is admitted to
the bar in California.
** Lisa Sachs is the Director of CCSI, where she oversees three areas of focus:
investments in extractive industries, investments in land and agriculture, and investment law
and policy. She received a B.A. in economics from Harvard University, and earned her J.D.
and M.A. in international affairs from Columbia University, where she was a James Kent
Scholar and recipient of the Parker School Certificate in International and Comparative Law.
She is admitted to the bar in New York.
*** Nathan Lobel is a J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School, where he focuses on
climate policy and political economy. Prior to law school, he was the Special Assistant to
the Director of CCSI, where his scholarship centered on international governance and the
clean energy transition. He received his B.A. in political science from Yale University with
high honors, during which time he also worked with the Yale Program on Climate Change
Communication and as a fossil fuel divestment organizer.
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tainable development goals and to withhold benefits
from investments that undermine these goals. Second,
it considers the effects of IIAs on policy-making processes and regulatory space, cautioning that current
provisions in IIAs protect the interests of investors
over those of other stakeholders and constrain states’
abilities to regulate investments in conformity with the
public interest. Finally, it suggests that international
agreements could and should do more to address
transnational governance gaps, regulatory races to
the bottom, and global commons problems, where international commitments related to the governance of
investment could advance development outcomes.
While the authors affirm the importance of foreign direct investment and international investment governance to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, they argue that existing IIAs must be
meaningfully reformed and future treaties reimagined
in order to align with the sustainable development
goals.
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INTRODUCTION
I. THE NEED FOR NEW THINKING ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
POLICY
In 2015, the 193 United Nations (“U.N.”) member states
unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
including seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”) designed to tackle the most pressing global problems and put society on
a development trajectory that is equitable and environmentally
sound. 1 The goals laid out an ambitious and wide-reaching development agenda and called for unprecedented global coordination to end
poverty, achieve gender equality, protect the environment and fight
climate change, promote peace, and strengthen global institutions by
the year 2030.
Achieving the SDGs will require the tremendous mobilization
of public and private investment; estimates suggest at least a $2.5 trillion annual investment gap in developing countries alone. 2 The 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development recognized the need for governments to encourage “financial flows, including foreign direct investment, to States where the need is greatest,” and to “[a]dopt and
implement investment promotion regimes for least developed countries.” 3
Indeed, foreign direct investment (“FDI”) is critical to sus1. G.A. Res. 70/1, at 1–2, 14, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development].
2. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2014:
Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, at 140, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2014 (2014).
3. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 21, 26 (listing Goals
10.b and 17.5).

(f) Johnson et al (58-1) (Do Not Delete)

2019]

11/27/2019 2:08 PM

ALIGNING IIAs WITH SDGs

61

tainable development objectives because it represents real economic
activity being directed into a country. 4 FDI can be an efficient and
effective way to transfer capital and technologies across borders and,
when the proper policies and conditions are in place, an important
means to spur environmentally sound economic growth and development through employment, infrastructure development, technology
transfer, tax revenues, and other economic linkages.
However, FDI does not automatically generate positive environmental, economic, and social outcomes, and can at times harm
host countries and communities. Even when FDI does generate positive outcomes, the price paid to attract FDI (e.g., in the form of direct
subsidies, lost tax revenues, or relaxed or waived social or environmental regulations) may outweigh the benefits obtained. Laws, policies, and practices in host and home countries, and at the international level, instrumentally shape both whether FDI ultimately
contributes to sustainable development and how it impacts affected
stakeholders and the planet.
At the international level, the network of over 3,000 international investment agreements (“IIAs”) comprises a notable and potent
portion of the relevant governance framework. 5 These agreements
provide protections and other benefits to foreign investors, usually
enforceable through investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”). Support for IIAs is largely based on the premise that enforceable investor
protections will stimulate greater investment flows, which in turn is
assumed to promote development of the treaty parties. 6
4. The OECD Benchmark edition of FDI explains that FDI is:
a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the
direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an
enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy
other than that of the direct investor. . . . The “lasting interest” is evidenced
when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of the direct
investment enterprise.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: FOURTH EDITION 17 (2008). FDI is distinct from other kinds
of investment, such as portfolio flows, remittances, and other financial flows (e.g., bank
loans).
5. By the close of 2018, 3,340 IIAs had been ratified, 2,671 of which are in force.
International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB,
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/HV83-BYPP] (last accessed
Dec. 27, 2018). A growing minority of these agreements also includes provisions requiring
investment liberalization.
6. Joachim Pohl, Societal Benefits and Costs of International Investment Agreements
4–8 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 2018/01, 2018); see also THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Karl Sauvant & Lisa Sachs eds.,
2009).
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However, the veracity of this premise is uncertain at best.
First, states and other institutions have grown to appreciate that not
all investments contribute to development, and that policy interventions are often needed to ensure that the benefits of investment are
captured and the harms are avoided. 7 Second, a growing body of research questions whether IIAs actually deliver on their stated promise
to increase investment flows, 8 never mind at what cost, and never
mind whether those flows help or hinder the host or home countries’
development. Third, new research alleges that substantive and procedural aspects of investment treaties exacerbate inequality, 9 undermine the rule of law, 10 and discourage states from adopting environmental and public health measures. 11 In July 2018, the U.N.
Secretary General cautioned that:
international investment agreements, which are meant
to support foreign investment, often result in unintended consequences, such as constraining regulations
that support sustainable development when the regulations impact investor profits. Some countries have
become vulnerable to large financial penalties from
7. See, e.g., OECD, FDI QUALITIES TOOLKIT: INVESTMENT
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: PROGRESS REPORT III, at 3–4 (2019).

FOR

INCLUSIVE

AND

8. E.g., THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 6;
Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation
versus Causation 1–5 (Dep’t of Agric. & Res. Econ., U.C. Berkeley, Working Paper No.
1032, 2007); LISE JOHNSON ET AL., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES 4–5, 15 (2018); Pohl, supra note 6, at 4–8;
JONATHAN BONNITCHA, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1–12, 15 (2017), available at
https://iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/assessing-impacts-investment-treaties.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BXN2-G6GR].
9. Lisa Sachs & Lise Johnson, Investment Treaties, Investor-State Dispute Settlement
and Inequality: How International Rules and Institutions Can Exacerbate Domestic
Disparities 2 (Initiative for Pol’y Dialogue, Working Paper No. 306, 2018),
https://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/11/ISDS-and-Intra-national-inequality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZXN2-UGWV].
10. See MAVLUDA SATTOROVA, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATY LAW ON HOST
STATES: ENABLING GOOD GOVERNANCE? 59–61 (2018); Tom Ginsburg, International
Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance,
25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 108 (2005).
11. See Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill in a Warming World: The Threat to Climate
Policy Posed by Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 7 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 229, 229–30
(2018); Julia Brown, International Investment Agreements: Regulatory Chill in the Face of
Litigious Heat?, 3 W. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 24–25 (2013); Gus van Harten & Dayna Nadine
Scott, Investment Treaties and Internal Vetting of Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from
Canada, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 92, 92–93, 108–09 (2016).
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arbitration panels set up to settle investor-State disputes, impeding their ability to implement policies in
support of the Sustainable Development Goals. 12
Informed by this growing body of literature on and experience with the costs and benefits of IIAs, various governmental and
civil society stakeholders have begun to discuss whether IIAs and
ISDS, as currently designed and implemented, are the appropriate
standards for international economic governance, and if not, how
they should be reformed. 13
The SDGs provide a framework against which today’s analysts can evaluate the features and effects of existing IIAs, and consider the role such agreements could play. This paper argues that existing or re-imagined IIAs should be evaluated with respect to their
ability to:
• encourage and channel investments that contribute to
sustainable development, and withhold benefits from
those that do not;
• foster, and not constrain, responsible, SDG-advancing
governance at the national level; and
• promote international cooperation to overcome transnational and collective action challenges related to the
governance of international investment.
This paper unpacks each of those three elements. Part II of
this paper focuses on the role of IIAs in catalyzing, channeling, shaping, and/or discouraging investment flows and investment behavior,
and the resulting impacts thereof. Importantly, these evaluations
must consider not only IIAs’ net impacts on investment flows, but al12. U.N. Secretary-General, Int’l Fin. Sys. and Dev.: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶
62, U.N. Doc. A/73/280 (July 30, 2018).
13. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), for
instance, has tasked one of its working groups with a mandate to catalogue concerns with
investor-state dispute settlement, and discuss the desirability of reforms. U.N. GAOR, U.N.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], 50th Sess., Supp. No. 17 at paras. 263, 264,
U.N. Doc. A/72/17 (July 3–21, 2017). Information about the working group’s meetings is
NATIONS
COMMISSION
ON
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE,
available
at
UNITED
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/3Investor_State.html
[https://perma.cc/FL5S-2P85] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019). See also UNCTAD, World
Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, at 119–74, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015 (2015); Colum. Ctr. on Sustainable Inv., 10th Annual Columbia
International Investment Conference: Investment Treaty Reform: Reshaping Economic
Governance in an Era of Sustainable Development (Nov. 10–11, 2015); Colum. Ctr. on
Sustainable Inv., 13th Annual Columbia International Investment Conference: Rethinking
International Investment Governance: Principles for the 21th Century (Sept. 27–28, 2018).
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so their ability to promote investments that contribute to sustainable
development and to withhold benefits from those that undermine it.
Part III shifts from an analysis of IIAs’ impacts on investments to IIAs’ impact on domestic governance of those investments.
Because the potential outcomes of investment—both positive and
negative—depend to a significant extent on the regulatory frameworks that govern investor conduct, IIAs must also be evaluated in
light of their impacts on domestic governance systems and their ability to promote and strengthen, and not inhibit, developmentadvancing governance.
Finally, Part IV argues that IIAs should be evaluated for the
relevant opportunities they seize, or miss, to advance sustainable development through international cooperation. Importantly, IIAs
should address issues for which international law, collaboration, and
institutions are key, if not necessary. Such issues include races to the
bottom on taxation and regulation as well as collective action and
transnational challenges related to reducing global poverty and inequality, fighting climate change, and protecting human rights. The
transnational nature of corporate actors and capital also requires international cooperation to appropriately regulate and provide redress
for harms they might cause. This Part is particularly relevant in light
of the existential challenges that systems of international law, governance, and cooperation are facing, and the questions being raised
by domestic actors across the globe about the roles, legitimacy, and
beneficiaries of international norms and institutions. 14 There is a vital need for effective international governance, but also a vital need
to better identify and articulate the role of these international systems
and their value added for different issues and stakeholders.
While we affirm the importance of FDI and international investment governance to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, we argue that existing IIAs are not designed to promote SDG-enhancing foreign investment nor to facilitate strategic international cooperation, and may in fact undermine development by
supporting harmful investments and constraining governments’ abilities to prevent or address those resulting harms. Existing IIAs must

14. The literature on these topics is vast. On the promise of, and challenges in
achieving, global cooperation, see, e.g., TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION
(2004); on some manifestations and causes of backlash against globalization, see, e.g.,
Richard Javad Heydarian, Asian Fury: Rodrigo Duterte and the Populist Backlash Against
Globalization, 38 HARV. INT’L REV. 36 (2017); OECD, Fixing Globalisation: Time to Make
It Work for All (2017), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264275096-en [https://perma.cc/2NUUFSJY]; Susan Franck, International Arbitration—Between Myth and Reality: 9th John E.C.
Brierley Memorial Lecture, 5 MCGILL J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2018).
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be meaningfully reformed (including, potentially, through termination and replacement), and future treaties reimagined in line with this
three-part analysis in order to align international investment governance to the SDGs. 15
II. IIAS AND SDG-ADVANCING INVESTMENT
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognizes
the need to mobilize private investment to address key financing gaps
in achieving the SDGs. Specifically, the Financing for Development
Action Agenda identifies a need for increased investment in infrastructure, low carbon and climate resilient development, innovation
and clean technologies, and sustainable agriculture, among other sectors. 16 Yet, at present, FDI is not being directed into the locations,
sectors, or activities needed to maximize impact. 17 The key questions this raises are: how can international agreements help to catalyze, attract, and channel SDG-advancing investments? Should IIAs
withhold benefits from investments that do not advance, and potentially undermine, sustainable development? And how can and should
IIAs identify whether and to what extent investments are or are not
SDG-advancing? This section addresses those issues.
Part A describes how IIAs could and should promote and
shape FDI for sustainable development. It first synthesizes the fac15. LISE JOHNSON ET AL., CLEARING THE PATH: WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT AND
TERMINATION AS THE NEXT STEPS FOR REFORMING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 5–11
(2018).
16. Third International Conference on Financing for Development, Addis Ababa Action
Agenda, ¶¶ 7, 13, 14, 17, 60 (July 13–16, 2015), available at https://un.org/esa/ffd/wpcontent/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJP4-HW2X].
17. U.N. DEP’T ON ECON. & SOC. AFF. [UNDESA] ET AL., WORLD ECONOMIC
SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 2018: UPDATE AS OF MID-2018, at 5, 20, U.N. Sales No.
E.18.II.C.2 (2018). This report addresses, for instance, the distribution of investment across
locations and sectors. Id. at 5 (“In many low-income countries, where the marginal return to
any investment tends to be relatively high, the level of investment appears to be insufficient
to achieve a more sustained and inclusive growth, especially in parts of Africa. Moreover,
investment remains highly concentrated in extractive industries, rather than laying
foundations for a more diversified economy.”). It also addresses patterns of investment in
the energy mix and implications for climate change. Id. at 20 (“Renewables accounted for
61 per cent of all newly-installed net power capacity in 2017. . . . If the pace of power
transition were to continue at this rate, as a conservative estimate it would take at least 55
years for the share of renewables in total capacity to reach 50 per cent. In this context,
achieving the target of the Paris Agreement poses an immense challenge.”). See also
UNDESA ET AL., WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 2017, at vii, 79, U.N. Sales
No. E.17.II.C.2 (2017) (highlighting similar issues).
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tors, including government policies, that can influence investment
decisions. It then summarizes research on the rather unclear connections between the current stock of IIAs and investment decisions, and
offers examples of treaty practices that, as compared to practices typifying the universe of existing treaties, stand out for their more targeted efforts to catalyze SDG-advancing investment.
Then, Part B discusses the need to better ensure IIAs do not
subsidize or support SDG-undermining investment. In this context,
Part B also explores the gradations between SDG-advancing and
SDG-undermining investment, and the role of governance in shaping
investment outcomes, a theme further developed in Part III.
A. Catalyzing and Channeling Investment for the SDGs
A number of factors may prevent investments from being
made. These barriers may result from explicit public polices, like
host country bans or restrictions on foreign investment in particular
places (e.g., border zones) or sectors (e.g., critical infrastructure).
But they may also include softer barriers, such as risky or costly legal, economic, and political environments in the host country that
cause uncertainty and threaten project profitability. 18 Barriers can also result from factors like information asymmetries, linguistic differences, or geographical distance, which all impede identification and
pursuit of economic opportunities by an investor from one country in
the territory of another. Other barriers to investment include those
over which individual states have little control, such as geographical
features that make access to markets difficult. Barriers hindering investment may also arise from home state conduct, including through
sanctions barring investment in particular destinations, or tax treatment that aims to encourage repatriation to the home state rather than
reinvestment of FDI-generated profits in the host state. 19
States seeking to attract investment can and do work to address some of the policy-related barriers both unilaterally and in co18. Literature on barriers to FDI is rich. See, e.g., JOHN H. DUNNING, EXPLAINING
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION (1988); FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND GOVERNMENTS:
CATALYSTS FOR ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING (John H. Dunning & Rajneesh Narula eds.,
1997).
19. See, e.g., UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018: Investment and New
Industrial Policies, at 16, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2018 (2018) (predicting that tax
reforms in the U.S. would encourage repatriation of funds held overseas by U.S. MNEs and
result in decreased inward FDI flows into other countries). Tax treatment can encourage
repatriation to the home state rather than reinvestment of FDI-generated profits in the host
state.
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operation with other states. For instance, states may unilaterally open
up sectors to foreign investment, reduce or eliminate joint venture
mandates or performance requirements, provide certain types of
property rights protections, improve the quality and speed of their
administrative and judicial systems, invest in soft and hard infrastructure, and/or offer investment incentives. 20
Bilaterally and multilaterally, states may also pursue tools and
agreements related to investor protection, risk mitigation, and economic and political cooperation to attract and channel FDI. These
can be used, for instance, to help foreign investors better identify relevant cross-border opportunities; allow policymakers to understand
and remove barriers (at home or abroad) impeding mutually beneficial investment; provide financial, technical, and other support on a
special and differential treatment basis to aid public investments in
the crucial soft and hard infrastructure that enable private sector investment; and mitigate currency risk to allow for crucial infrastructure investments. 21 International instruments can also signal countries’ commitments to offer certain standards of treatment or abide by
certain norms; and they can include a range of mechanisms, including state-to-state peer review, informal consultations, and legalized
dispute settlement, to ensure that signals align with practice and to
monitor and strengthen adherence to commitments. Each of these
options varies in terms of its overall effectiveness as well as its costs
and benefits to investors, governments, and other stakeholders, with
those costs and benefits often depending a great deal on specific context.
IIAs are designed to attract FDI by formalizing state commitments to take actions that they could undertake unilaterally in the
absence of such agreements, rather than by committing to cooperative measures. For instance, some IIAs include commitments by
20. With respect to the final example, investment incentives may be offered in an
attempt to compensate for actual or perceived weaknesses as investment destinations. See
generally RETHINKING INVESTMENT INCENTIVES: TRENDS AND POLICY OPTIONS (Ana Teresa
Tavares Lehmann, Perrine Toledano, Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs eds., 2016) (exploring the
use, rationales, policy considerations, and governance efforts related to investment
incentives).
21. Foreign exchange risk can be a major barrier to international investment in viable
and sustainable infrastructure projects, especially projects in countries without welldeveloped local capital markets. There are, however, ways that international cooperation
can be used to help mitigate some of those risks. See, e.g., Tomoko Matsukawa et al.,
Foreign Exchange Risk Mitigation for Power and Water Projects in Developing Countries 9,
19 (World Bank Energy & Mining Sector Bd., Discussion Paper No. 9) (discussing, for
instance, a multilateral initiative to establish a local currency guarantee facility and a home
country’s establishment of an exchange rate liquidity facility).
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states to liberalize investment flows and open domestic sectors to
foreign investment. 22 Some IIAs also include restrictions on performance requirements, giving companies freer rein to invest and operate on the terms and conditions they want, unconstrained by policies
promoting domestic equity, local sourcing, and other FDI benefit
capture by host countries (notably, however, the treaties generally allow home states to impose performance requirements on investment
projects they support abroad). 23 And primarily, throughout their history, which is often said to have begun with the signing of the first
bilateral investment treaty between Germany and Pakistan in 1959,
provisions in investment treaties have largely focused on achieving
their promotion function by locking in, at the international level, state
promises to protect foreign investors from harms or losses suffered as
a result of state conduct. 24 States have thus committed in their treaties to provide foreign investors certain standards of treatment (with
hotly contested contours), and have often coupled those protections
with ISDS mechanisms that allow foreign investors to directly claim
and seek remedy for breach. 25
Proponents of IIAs have contended that these investment protections can catalyze international investment flows. 26 But, although
investment treaties might indeed affect how a company structures its
investment in a host state (e.g., encouraging investors to route their
investments through an intermediary state that has a strong investment treaty with the host state), 27 there is no clear or consistent evidence that the thousands of existing treaties have had any significant
effect on investors’ decisions regarding whether and how much to in-

22. See, e.g., Framework Agreement on the Promotion, Protection, and Liberalization
of Investment in Asia Pacific Trade Agreement Participating States art. 3, Dec. 15, 2009,
available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/2591/download [https://perma.cc/7JCG-Z6EV].
23. See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership arts. 9.10, 9.10(e), Feb. 4, 2016 (containing
restrictions on performance requirements and excluding performance requirements imposed
in connection with respect to export promotion and foreign aid programs, respectively),
available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaties/trans-pacific-partner
ship-agreement-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ [https://perma.cc/75C5-4CS2].
24. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Ger.-Pak., Nov. 25, 1959,
457 U.N.T.S. 23.
25. OECD, Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment Agreements: A
Large Sample Survey 8 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 2012/02,
2012).
26. THE EFFECT OF TREATIES
supra note 6, at 13, 16–17.

ON

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 6; Pohl,

27. See, e.g., Pohl, supra note 6, at 13.
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vest in particular host destinations. 28 As currently designed, therefore, IIAs do not seem to deliver on their policy promise of catalyzing international investment and associated benefits. 29
However, IIAs could employ different strategies. Rather than
imposing obligations on host governments regarding treatment of investments, investment treaties could address investment governance
more holistically, help to identify and overcome specific barriers to
investment, and include mechanisms and commitments on the part of
the home state to actively promote increased cross-border investment
flows, particularly in sectors and activities consistent with the states’
development objectives. Indeed, some treaties are already starting to
do this. 30 While the provisions tend to be hortatory, and are often excluded from the treaties’ formal enforcement mechanisms, they illustrate initial steps toward more impactful cooperation.
The Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement, for instance, explicitly includes state commitments to promote crossborder investment in activities designed to advance sustainable development and combat climate change through capacity and institutional building and informational exchange, including for the “identification of investment opportunities and the promotion and
development of business alliances in the field of environment.” 31
Other relevant provisions are included in the Cotonou
Agreement, concluded between the European Union (“EU”) and the
members of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (“ACP”) Group of
States in 2000 and subsequently amended. This agreement provides
for inter-state cooperation and EU assistance in a range of activities
that aim to increase cross-border investment flows. These include
28. See, e.g., JONATHAN BONNITCHA, SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION UNDER INVESTMENT
TREATIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 105–09 (2014); UNCTAD, supra note 2; THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 6. In contrast to studies
on the effects of IIAs on investment flows, studies have shown that bilateral and regional
trade agreements do have a positive impact on FDI. Max Büge, Do Preferential Trade
Agreements Increase Their Members’ Foreign Direct Investment? (German Dev. Inst.
/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Discussion Paper No. 37/2014, 2014).
29. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 8. Moreover, and as discussed in subsequent
sections, there are economic, social, and governance costs associated with the standards of
protection provided to foreign investors and the ISDS mechanism used to enforce them,
which may undermine progress on other SDGs.
30. See Kathryn Gordon, Joachim Pohl & Marie Bouchard, Investment Treaty Law,
Sustainable Development and Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact Finding Survey 9–17
(OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., 2014).
31. Agreement for the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, Japan-Mex., art.
147(1), Sept. 17, 2009, available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/internationalinvestment-agreements/treaty-files/2696/download [https://perma.cc/XG2Z-GV7Y].
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capacity building for investment promotion agencies, dissemination
of information regarding business opportunities in ACP states, provision of risk capital and investment guarantees, and assistance in developing relevant technical, managerial, and professional expertise. 32
Chapter 9 of the Switzerland-China Free Trade Agreement
(“FTA”) likewise sets forth areas in which the parties may cooperate
to promote cross-border investment, and provides for the parties to
engage in further dialogue regarding investment facilitation and liberalization. 33 The Switzerland-China FTA also has a fairly detailed
chapter on economic and technical cooperation that aims, inter alia,
to “create and enhance sustainable trade and investment opportunities
by facilitating trade and investment between the parties.” 34
Other relevant agreements include Brazil’s Cooperation and
Facilitation Investment Agreements, which the country has been negotiating from roughly 2013 onward. 35 Brazil’s approach, developed
based on consultations with internal government entities, private sector coalitions, and other stakeholders and experts, focuses on enabling states to identify and overcome barriers to investment and solve
challenges investors face. These agreements seek to advance investment promotion objectives by, for instance, establishing ombudsmen
or “Focal Points” responsible for providing support to investors from
the other contracting party. 36 The ombudsmen or Focal Point’s duties include providing “timely and useful information on regulatory
issues on general investment or on special projects,” fielding com32. See Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member
States, of the Other Part, ch. 7, June 23, 2000 (amended 2005, 2010), available at
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2499/
download [https://perma.cc/KWF3-JLET].
33. See Free Trade Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Swiss
Confederation, China-Switz., ch. 9, July 6, 2013, available at https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2751/download [https://perma.
cc/BM4B-T523].
34. Id. art. 13.1(b).
35. See, e.g., José Henrique Vieira Martins, Brazil’s Cooperation and Facilitation
Investment Agreements (CFIA) and Recent Developments, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE INV.
(June 12, 2017), https://iisd.org/itn/2017/06/12/brazils-cooperation-facilitation-investmentagreements-cfia-recent-developments-jose-henrique-vieira-martins [https://perma.cc/VYV7GPAP]; Lise Johnson, et al., International Investment Agreements, 2014: A Review of
Trends and New Approaches, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
POLICY 2014-2015, at 15, 22–24 (Andrea Bjorklund ed., 2016).
36. Model Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement, Braz., art. 18., 2015,
available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/4786/download [https://perma.cc/AX93-59F8].
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plaints from investors, and preventing potential conflicts. 37
The examples of investment-related treaty provisions referred
to above are arguably modest in terms of their focus on and commitments to advancing investment flows for sustainable development;
nevertheless, they highlight possibilities for investment treaties, if reoriented, to more actively mobilize and shape investment for sustainable development. One could imagine more robust provisions included in IIAs, such as commitments to increase investment into the
less developed country partner or to help increase investment in particular sectors or activities.
Moreover, one could envision the creation of processes and
institutions to routinely evaluate the impact and effectiveness of existing treaty provisions on investment promotion and facilitation,
help identify the factors relevant to those provisions’ success, and inform where and how to improve treaty language, implementation and
associated outcomes. These evaluations could be conducted ad hoc
by treaty parties individually or together, or, preferably, be built into
the treaty to support its continued relevance and utility. Overall,
therefore, there is much that IIAs still can and should do to help identify and overcome barriers to SDG-supportive investment. Their present focus on disciplining state conduct is too narrow in terms of the
range of policy options pursued and, as discussed below, overly
broad in terms of the nature of potential investor beneficiaries covered.
B. Not Subsidizing Harmful Investments
In addition to more proactively promoting investments that
contribute to the SDGs, so too should IIAs discourage—or at least
not offer additional protections or support to—investments with
clearly negative effects. Such investments may include, for example,
investments in fossil fuel extraction and related infrastructure, investments that result from or perpetuate corrupt dealings, or those violating international labor standards.
The substantive benefits and protections offered in investment
treaties, as they have been negotiated, interpreted, and applied to
date, are additional to and go further than protections offered by
analogous areas of domestic and international law. 38 The procedural
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims for
Reflective Loss: Insights from Advanced Systems of Corporate Law 29 (OECD Working
Papers on Int’l Inv., 2014) (discussing relative treatment of shareholders); Lise Johnson,
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privileges offered through IIAs, namely the ability to sue states directly through ISDS for IIA breaches, similarly exceed those available under domestic and other areas of international law, 39 and magnify the strength of investors’ substantive treaty protections. 40 These
benefits act as regulatory incentives that, even if not effective at attracting investment, effectively subsidize foreign investments.
Framed in this manner, it is uncontroversial to suggest that governments should evaluate which types of investments, investors, and activities are deserving of such subsidies, and ensure that the protections and benefits afforded under IIAs do not support investments
that may undermine the SDGs. 41
In conducting these evaluations, governments can break the
potential impacts of international investment into four categories:
1. Impacts that are or are almost unavoidably net negative in the host country. This might include investments for trade in or production of goods or services
illegal in the host state, 42 or investments that would
Lisa Sachs & Jeffrey Sachs, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and U.S.
Domestic Law 3–5 (Colum. Ctr. on Sustainable Inv., Policy Paper, 2015) (highlighting
various ways in which protections under U.S. law differ from those under investment law);
Lise Johnson, A Fundamental Shift in Power: Permitting International Investors to Convert
their Economic Expectations Into Rights, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 106, 112–15 (2018)
(comparing the doctrine of estoppel under domestic law with that under investment law).
Additionally, the treaties may offer other benefits, such as market access rights and stronger
intellectual property protections.
39. When investors sue states through ISDS, they are able to do so free from the
restrictions on suit that may be relevant at the domestic level. These restrictions may relate
to, for instance, limits on standing, ripeness, justiciability, and standards or availability of
review. Johnson, Sachs & Sachs, supra note 38, at 8. Investors’ abilities to sue are also
strong as compared to rights available to individuals and entities to sue under other areas of
international law. International economic law other than investment law establishes that
disputes should be resolved at the state-to-state level. In international human rights law, for
example, where direct rights of action are permitted against the state, those bringing claims
must generally have exhausted domestic remedies before turning to the international forum.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/24 (2017) (describing State obligations under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities and
calling for similar assessments of human rights impacts by home states in certain contexts).
42. The operational regulations of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(“MIGA”) of the World Bank provide that “legally prohibited activities such as narcotics
production shall not be covered. MIGA shall not cover investments that do not comply with
the national laws of the Host Country, including those that protect core labor standards.”
See Multilateral Inv. Guar. Agency [MIGA], Operational Regulations, at 31 (Aug. 27, 2002)
https://www.miga.org/sites/default/files/archive/Documents/miga_documents/Operations-
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significantly and irreversibly harm natural ecosystems,
require resettlement of large numbers of people, 43 or
otherwise impact critical ecological zones. 44
2. Impacts that are or are almost unavoidably net negative in the home country. This category includes, perhaps most clearly, outward investments made solely
for the purpose of avoiding taxes otherwise due to the
home country, such as “inversions,” in which companies move overseas to reduce their tax burden. 45
3. Impacts that may be positive in the home and host
country (at least in the near-term), but are negative in
third countries or for the global commons. The category might include investment in exploration for and
extraction of new fossil fuel reserves, projects that result in major deforestation harmful to biodiversity, and
production and trade of harmful products for consumption in third countries.
4. Impacts whose positive and negative effects in the
home and/or host country depend on corporate conRegulations-030115.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ATP-C5RL].
43. The United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”), for instance,
will not support “[c]onstruction of dams that significantly and irreversibly: (a) disrupt
natural ecosystems upstream or downstream of the dam; or (b) alter natural hydrology; or (c)
inundate large land areas; or (d) impact biodiversity; or (e) displace large numbers of
inhabitants (5,000 persons or more); or (f) impact local inhabitants’ ability to earn a
livelihood.” OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP. [OPIC], ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICY
STATEMENT app. B, ¶ 3 (2017), https://opic.gov/sites/default/files/files/final%20revised
%20ESPS%2001132017(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/T5YW-VBX5].
44. OPIC also includes on its list of Categorically Prohibited Projects those projects for
“[c]onversion or degradation of . . . forest-related Critical Natural Habitats.” “Critical
Natural Habitats” are defined as:
Existing internationally recognized protected areas, areas initially recognized
as protected by traditional local communities (e.g., sacred groves), and sites
that maintain conditions vital to the viability of protected areas (as determined
by the environmental assessment procedure); and (2) Sites identified on
supplementary lists by authoritative sources identified by OPIC. Such sites
may include areas recognized by traditional local communities (e.g., sacred
groves), areas with known high suitability for biodiversity conservation and
sites that are critical for vulnerable, migratory or endangered species. Listings
are based on systematic evaluations of such factors as species richness, the
degree of endemism, rarity, and vulnerability of component species,
representativeness and the integrity of ecosystem processes.
Id. ¶ 1.
45. The United States’ OPIC’s list of Categorically Prohibited Projects includes
investments by “[c]ompanies which are treated as inverted corporations under 6 U.S.C §
395(b).” Id. at 40.
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duct and appropriate government regulation. The impacts can result from the nature of the investment’s
relevant sector, activity, or project, and the way the
investment is managed and governed. 46
Governments risk reputational and potentially legal consequences for affirmatively supporting outward investments that harm
home 47 and host countries and communities, third countries, and the
global commons. 48 Home governments are consequently increasingly assessing and addressing conduct and impacts of the firms they
support overseas. 49 Some, for instance, are taking steps to ensure
that they do not incentivize harm-causing investments, and that any
government support for outward investing firms requires an assess46. For a discussion of sector-level issues and how IIAs could address them, see
Section IV. Section IV.C, for instance, discusses impacts on cross-border investment in the
chemicals sector as projected in the EU–China IIA Sustainability Impact Assessment.
47. OPIC, for example, implicitly recognizes the potential for negative consequences
of outward-investment-promotion activities in pledging to “assesses the projected U.S.
economic impact [of a given potential OPIC-supported project] to ensure it will not harm
U.S. jobs or the U.S. economy” and “decline the support for any project that would result in
the loss of U.S. jobs.”
Our Investment Policies: U.S. Effect, OPIC,
https://www.opic.gov/who-we-are/OPIC-policies/US-effects
[https://perma.cc/ZQQ4H6UC] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019).
48. See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, supra note 41. See also Lise
Johnson & Sophie Thomashausen, Raising the Bar, Home Country Efforts to Regulate
Foreign Investment for Sustainable Development 5–10 (Background Note to Ninth Annual
Investment Conference, 2014) (noting legal and reputational arguments in favor of home
state efforts to assess effects of investments they actively support).
49. Such references to the roles of home states under human rights law can be found,
for instance, in the Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, supra note 41, at 1. See, e.g.,
Danish Inst. for Human Rights & Int’l Corp. Accountability Roundtable, Nat’l Action Plans
on Bus. and Human Rights: A Toolkit for the Development, Implementation, and Review of
State Commitments to Bus. and Human Rights Frameworks 18 (June 2014). This Toolkit
states that “for States that function as headquarters for companies operating abroad, a key
component of NAPs must also be addressing the extraterritorial impacts of such companies
and how those impacts can be addressed by the application of national laws and policies.”
Id. Some of the Scoping Questions that are used in the Toolkit to assess “how far current,
law, policy and other measures at the national level give effect to the State’s duty to protect
human rights under the [UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights] and other
international business and human rights standards” are relevant for IIAs. Id. at vii. For
example, the Toolkit lists the following as a “Scoping Question” for assessing compliance
with UN Guiding Principle 2: “Do State institutions that support overseas investment have
and enforce performance standards that support the protection and promotion of human
rights?” Id. at 98. A Scoping Question for UN Guiding Principle 7 is whether the State has
“a procedure for follow-up on issues identified through the investigative process (for
example, through the denial or withdrawal of existing public support or services to business
enterprises that are involved in human rights abuse or other crimes)?” Id. at 121.
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ment of net-positive contribution, with an analysis of distributional
effects. 50
One analogous area in which governments have recognized
the potential for negative consequences of outward-investmentpromotion activities—and have taken steps to prevent those unwanted outcomes and encourage optimal behavior—is political risk insurance and export credit insurance. 51 These government-sponsored insurance schemes, which aim to decrease risk for outward-oriented
enterprises, often incorporate relatively robust screens and systems
designed to help ensure that beneficiaries do not have deleterious social, environmental, and human rights impacts in host countries. 52
Policies of the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”), 53 the United States’ Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”), 54 Switzerland’s Export Risk Insurance
(“SERV”), 55 and the OECD’s “Common Approaches” 56 are but some
50. Analogous efforts to identify and avoid or mitigate harms from FDI are also taking
place in the context of initiatives for screening inward FDI. For an example of a screening
framework that came into force in April 2019, see Regulation 2019/452 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 Establishing a Framework for the
Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union, 2019 O.J. (L 79) 1, 1.
51. See, e.g., OPIC, Environmental and Social Policy Statement, supra note 43, at 37–
39; see also OPIC, Our Investment Policies: U.S. Effects, supra note 47 (discussing
restrictions on OPIC’s support). The German Investment Corporation offers another
example of a government-owned entity using development criteria to inform, monitor and
evaluate the projects it supports and try to advance positive outcomes. Our Impact: We
INVESTITIONSUND
Measure
Development
Outcome,
DEUTSCHE
ENTWICKLUNGSGESELLSCHAFT [DEG], https://www.deginvest.de/International-financing/
DEG/%C3%9Cber-uns/Was-wir-bewirken/Wir-messen-Wirksamkeit/
[https://perma.cc/
5Q2S-2HKE] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019). Other examples are included in the text, infra
notes 53–56. See also Kernaghan Webb, Political Risk Insurance, CSR and the Mining
Sector, 54 INT’L J. L. & MGMT 394, 404 (2012).
52. See, e.g., OPIC, Environmental and Social Policy Statement, supra note 43, at 37–
39; Webb, supra note 51, at 404. See also discussion in text, infra Section II.B. In a highly
visible case, OPIC cancelled the insurance policy of Freeport McMoRan’s Grassberg mine
in Papua after an environmental report revealed extensive environmental violations. Jane
Perlez & Raymond Bonner, Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of Waste, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 27, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/27/world/asia/below-a-mountain-ofwealth-a-river-of-waste.html [https://perma.cc/QC3D-N3XU].
53. MIGA, supra note 42, at 89–95.
54. OPIC, Environmental and Social Policy Statement, supra note 43, at 37–39; see
also OPIC, Our Investment Policies: U.S. Effects, supra note 47 (discussing restrictions on
OPIC’s support).
55. Swiss Export Risk Ins., SERV Guidelines for Reviewing Environmental, Social,
and Human-Rights Issues, at 1, Version 4.2 (2017).
56. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Common Approaches for Officially
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of the examples of how governments and intergovernmental bodies
have dedicated efforts to ensure that investment and export creditinsurance programs only support enterprises and activities that adhere
to specific environmental, social, human rights, and governance
standards. These include both ex ante screens and ex post exclusions.
In terms of ex ante screens, some of these programs flatly exclude
certain types of projects, typically the category 1, 2 and 3 types of
projects noted above, from coverage due to the negative environmental and social impacts they may have. 57 Other ex ante screens relevant for some category 4-type issues include requirements that the
project score above a certain number of points on a “development
matrix” that takes into account such factors as job creation, training,
private sector development, and technology and knowledge transfer. 58
In terms of ex post exclusions, MIGA’s contracts, for instance, specify that MIGA may terminate its coverage if the insurance holder violates its contractual obligations to MIGA (which include obligations to operate the investment project in accordance
with the host country’s laws), materially violates relevant World
Bank Performance Standards and Environmental Guidelines, or engages in corrupt, fraudulent, or other wrongful practices. 59 MIGA’s
contracts also provide that MIGA may terminate insurance contracts
if the projects (not limited to the actions or fault of the investor contracted with MIGA) materially violate those same obligations (e.g.,
obligations to comply with host state law and the Performance Standards and Environmental Guidelines, and to not engage in money
laundering, corruption, or certain other wrongful activities). 60
In addition to misconduct that constitutes an automatic or
permissible ground for terminating the contract or denying coverage,
Supported Export Credits and Environmental and Social Due Diligence, at 6 (June 28,
2012). This list is not exclusive. The German Investment Corporation, for instance, is
another example of a government-owned entity using development criteria to inform,
monitor and evaluate the projects it supports.
57. These may include projects that require displacement of large numbers of
inhabitants; projects involving production of materials subject to international phase-outs or
bans; transboundary trade in waste or waste products; extractive industry projects in natural
parks, and fisheries investments harmful to vulnerable and protected species or damaging to
biodiversity. See, e.g., OPIC, Environmental and Social Policy Statement, supra note 43, at
37–39.
58. OPIC, ANNUAL POLICY REPORT 2011, at 38 (2011).
59. See, e.g., MIGA, Contract of Guarantee for Loan Guarantees between the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and [Guarantee Holder], arts. 12.1, 13.4(c) (Dec.
2012).
60. Id. art. 13.4.
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these insurance programs often also state that a broader range of conduct can be grounds to deny coverage if it contributed to harm suffered by the investor or prompted action taken by the host state. 61
Canada’s approach to supporting outward investing firms further illustrates how governments could take action to avoid supporting harm-causing investments and activities. For instance, it has indicated that it may withdraw or deny trade advocacy support and/or
financial assistance to companies that do not adhere to the government’s environmental and social policies in their overseas activities, 62 and that do not comply in good faith with dispute resolution
mechanisms instituted to ensure the companies adhere to standards of
responsible business conduct. 63
Together these examples highlight ways in which home states
or institutions have begun developing tools to better ensure that,
when actively supporting international investment, their efforts do
not inadvertently cause or exacerbate harm, or aid those engaged in
wrongful conduct. They also show how governments can try to encourage desired behaviors and outcomes by supported investors and
projects.
The outward investment support schemes discussed above are
not free from critique. Some have contended that they fail to adequately identify, prevent and address potential harms, and do not go
far enough to positively contribute to sustainable development impacts and outcomes. 64 Nevertheless, they stand in marked contrast to
the laissez-faire approach IIAs take to providing coverage and protection to investments. Although IIAs share a similar mission with
other government programs supporting outward-oriented firms, raise
similar concerns regarding reputational and legal risks, and are similarly subject to SDG 17’s call for policy coherence across government activities, IIAs are not as discerning in terms of who and what

61. Id. art. 9.1.
62. Export Dev. Can., Environmental and Social Risk Management Policy, at 5 (Nov.
1, 2010).
63. Responsible
Business
Conduct
Abroad,
GLOB.
AFFAIRS
CAN.,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/
other-autre/csr-rse.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/KF6Z-39HZ].
64. See, e.g., Oil Change Int’l, Risking It All: How Export Development Canada’s
Support for Fossil Fuels Drives Climate Change, at 4 (Nov. 2018). See also Accountability
Counsel et al., Comment Letter on OPIC’s Draft Revised Environmental and Social Policy
Statement 4–5 (Nov. 23, 2016), available at https://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/
2016/11/accountability-counsel-and-partners-submit-comments-on-opics-draftenvironmental-and-social-policy-statement/ [https://perma.cc/H59R-7EFX].
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they protect and support. 65 Absent such nuance or consequences,
IIAs will continue to subsidize harmful investments. 66
Governments wanting to ensure that their IIAs do not subsidize or support harm-causing activities could exclude certain investments or types of investments (e.g., those falling into categories 1, 2
and 3 above) from coverage, or from certain treaty protections or
benefits. This can be done by enumerating exclusions in the IIA itself; designating a joint committee under the treaty that has the authority to craft and refine a list of investment projects that are clearly
and categorically excluded from treaty coverage or from specific protections or benefits; and/or making clear through domestic legislation
of the home state that an investor will not qualify for coverage under
the home state’s treaties for certain designated types of outward investments.
Exclusions could be categorical, based on the type of investment or investor activity, or could be based on subjective assessments of investments’ alignment with the SDGs. Categorical exclusions from treaty coverage or specific provisions might be desirable,
for instance, for governments seeking to send a clear message discouraging future investment in developing new fossil fuel reserves,
the vast majority of which will not be able to be exploited if the
world is to avoid warming above 2oC. 67 Governments could also
categorically exclude investors that violate certain core standards of
conduct mandated by the host state, home state, or beyond, through
obligations not to engage in corruption and bribery, and responsibilities not to contribute to violations of human rights. While some treaties currently deny protections for investments that have been made in
violation of the law, 68 or that were made through corruption or
65. Importantly, incorporating these provisions and mechanisms does not necessarily
leave investors without any protection in the host country. The home state may still exercise
diplomatic protection or state-to-state dispute resolution if there is a violation of the treaty
that affects an investor engaged in misconduct in the host state. Aleksandr Shapovalov,
Should a Requirement of ‘Clean Hands’ Be a Prerequisite to the Exercise of Diplomatic
Protection? Human Rights Implications of the International Law Commission’s Debate, 20
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 829, 845 (2005).
66. Lise Johnson, Aligning Swiss Investment Treaties with Sustainable Development:
An Assessment of Current Policy Coherence and Options for Future Action 19 (Colum. Ctr.
on Sustainable Inv., 2015).
67. James Leaton, Unburnable Carbon: Are the World’s Financial Markets Carrying a
Carbon Bubble 9 (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011). See also Gus van Harten, An ISDS
Carve-Out to Support Action on Climate Change 1, 2 (Osgoode Legal Stud. Res. Paper,
Sept. 20, 2015).
68. See Rahim Moloo & Alex Khachaturian, The Compliance with the Law
Requirement in International Investment Law, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1473, 1479–80
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fraud, 69 no agreement in force denies protections to specific investors
and their investments based on previous wrongful conduct by the investor in any location (in the host state, home state, or elsewhere) or
project. 70 This contrasts with other state-sponsored support schemes
in which particular investors (and their affiliates) can be blacklisted
and denied support for any project for a certain duration of time. 71
In addition to categorical exclusions, IIAs could also incorporate more subjective tests in determining treaty or ISDS coverage.
These include requirements that “investors” or “investments” must
exhibit features or comply with standards meriting some subsequent
analysis. For instance, treaties may require that investments, to be
covered, be “responsible” 72 or continue to “comply with the law of
the host state” 73 or the home state 74 during the duration of the in(2011). A few texts, such as the India Model BIT in its article 1.3(i), also require that
investments, to qualify as such, be “operated” in accordance with the law of the host state.
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, India, art. 1.3(i), 2015, available at
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/3560/
download [https://perma.cc/KR8J-KYHK] [hereinafter India Model BIT].
69. See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, art. 8.18(3),
Oct. 30, 2016, O.J. (L11),
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/
september/tradoc_152806.pdf [https://perma.cc/M475-U2VW] [hereinafter CETA] (“For
greater certainty, an investor may not submit a claim under this Section if the investment has
been made through fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, corruption, or conduct
amounting to an abuse of process.”). See also India Model BIT, supra note 68, art. 13.4
(“An investor may not submit a claim to arbitration under this Chapter if the investment has
been made through fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, corruption, money
laundering or conduct amounting to an abuse of process or similar illegal mechanisms.”).
70. Some model agreements, however, seem to be taking steps in this direction. See
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Colom., 12 (on file with authors).
71. For instance, firms or individuals found to have engaged in one of the World Bank
Group’s sanctionable practices (fraud, corruption, collusion, coercion, or obstruction) are
debarred, meaning that they will not be eligible for World Bank Group support for specified
time periods, or conditionally debarred, meaning that they will only be eligible if certain
conditions are met. Additionally, the World Bank Group’s debarments are recognized by
some other multilateral development banks, and those banks’ debarments are similarly
recognized by the World Bank, pursuant to the 2010 Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of
Debarment Decisions. See World Bank Group [WBG], World Bank Group Sanctions
System, Annual Report, FY2018, at 61–63 (2018).
72. See Jesse Coleman et al., International Investment Agreements, 2017: A Review of
Trends and New Approaches, in YEARBOOK ON INT’L INV. L. & POLICY 99, 108 (Lisa Sachs,
Jesse Coleman & Lise Johnson eds., 2018) (discussing the Colombia Model BIT).
73. As noted above, some treaties condition protection on an investment being made in
compliance with the law of the host state. See Moloo & Khachaturian, supra note 68, at
1479–80. It is less common, however, to see requirements that such investments be
maintained in accordance with the relevant laws. When investments are required to be
maintained in accordance with domestic laws, questions will likely arise regarding, for
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vestment. Or, IIAs could specify that covered investments entail a
commitment of resources to the host state and make a contribution to
its economic development. Whether an investor or investment qualifies under these criteria are issues that could then be resolved using
different approaches, such as a decision by a treaty committee or by
domestic officials from the relevant treaty parties. Conditioning treaty benefits on compliance with substantive norms could serve to induce compliance with those standards. 75
While treaties could usefully exclude such investors or investments from treaty coverage, treaties should at the very least limit
access to dispute settlement and associated remedies for such investors or investments, even if the protections broadly remain. An IIA,
for instance, could partially or entirely limit the ability of such investors to sue the state directly through ISDS or could limit the claims
that can be brought and remedies or sanctions awarded. All investors
could still seek protections and remedies for perceived improper conduct through other avenues, including legal actions in the domestic or
other contractually specified forum, recourse under applicable human
rights instruments that protect rights to property and access to justice, 76 and diplomatic protection by the home state (including through
state-to-state dispute resolution) for violations of customary international law. 77 In short, there are various approaches treaties could
employ to ensure that they are not supporting harmful investments
that undermine, rather than advance, sustainable development

instance, how to establish breach (e.g., is a conviction required?), and whether there will be
any materiality requirement relating to the nature of the breach (e.g., intentional or
negligent) or the nature of the law (e.g., relating to civil or criminal offenses) that will affect
whether violation warrants exclusion from protection or ISDS.
74. The authors are unaware of any treaty requiring that investors comply with the law
of the home state in order to be protected by the home state’s treaties, apart from
requirements that the investor be a national of or incorporated in that state.
75. For an overview of how this is done in the analogous context of insurance, see,
e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 198 (2012).
76. Protection for natural and legal persons, however, is not always the same under
human rights instruments as it is under investment treaty law. See Lise Johnson, Jesse
Coleman, Brooke Güven & Lisa Sachs, Alternatives to Investor-State Dispute Settlement 13
(Colum. Ctr. on Sustainable Inv. Working Paper, 2019).
77. IIAs offering broader protections than political risk insurance, which investors
must purchase, might be justified if IIAs only offered government guarantees of basic
protections against egregious violations of customary international law, namely, unremedied denials of justice in the host state. But, even in more recent IIAs that offer
narrower investor protections relative to older treaties and interpretations thereof, the
substantive and procedural benefits IIAs provide are not so limited.
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obectives.
III. IIAS AND SDG-ADVANCING GOVERNANCE
The positive or negative impacts of an investment project are
not necessarily inherent to the project, allowing for the specific inclusions or exclusions described in Part II, but often depend to a significant degree on the governance frameworks that shape and regulate
investor practice. Whether the impacts of increased investments in
certain sectors, activities, or projects are desirable or not (and in what
ways) is a function of specific corporate policies and practices as informed, regulated, and enforced by relevant domestic and international governance frameworks.
Given the importance of governance to investment outcomes,
and the intrinsic importance of justice, rule of law, and strong institutions (as reflected in SDG 16), it is crucial to consider how IIAs affect these instrumental and normative aspects of governance. How
do IIAs affect the extent to which domestic institutions align with the
governance pillars of the SDGs? How do IIAs affect the way in
which governments govern investments and try to influence their
economic, social, and environmental outcomes? This section examines those issues, and highlights considerations for states seeking to
more proactively tailor provisions to promote good governance and
preserve their abilities to regulate in the public interest. It begins in
Part A by examining how IIAs may impact domestic policy-making
processes and the interests they reflect. Part B then examines IIAs’
effects on the policies themselves that states can adopt.
A. IIAs and Distortion of Policy-Making Processes
IIAs are often cited as tools that can be used to improve the
rule of law and good governance by holding governments accountable for abuses of authority. 78 Yet, while in theory this might be plausible, 79 evidence of any improvement remains lacking. 80 Indeed,
studies examining the issue have found that BITs and ISDS claims

78. See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and
Comparative Public Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC
LAW 155, 177–81 (Stephan Schill ed., 2010).
79. BONNITCHA supra note 28, at 136–39.
80. See Pohl, supra note 6, at 55–69.
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may have negative effects on the rule of law. 81 There are several
theories that may explain these negative effects. For one, IIAs may
reduce governments’ incentives to improve their domestic governance. To the extent that IIAs make it less risky for foreign investors
to invest in jurisdictions with little respect for the rule of law, governments may not face pressures to improve their investment climate
and ensure that there are rules and systems in place enabling constituents, generally, to hold the government to account. Similarly, allowing foreign investors to circumvent domestic legal systems to
pursue claims in international arbitration can undermine the role and
perceived authority and legitimacy of domestic institutions. Investment treaties could, but do not, contain provisions or mechanisms to
build capacity of and trust in courts or administrative bodies, initiatives that could better ensure that investors (both foreign and domestic) have access to fair, effective, and efficient legal systems.
This contrasts with the approach taken in international human
rights law—another area of law that similarly provides private actors
the right to bring claims seeking supra-national review of government conduct. In the context of international human rights law, it has
been highlighted that the objective of providing for supra-national
review of domestic conduct is to “cause States internally to guarantee
basic rights and not merely to allow access to the [treaty’s dispute
settlement] system.” 82 Correspondingly, requiring exhaustion of local remedies remains important to “force[] applicants both to take
every available course and to agitate for change when remedies turn
out to be ineffective.” 83 This view, which considers supra-national
mechanisms as an instrument for advancing domestic reforms, but
recognizes the crucial role of domestic systems as the main targets
for and implementers of those reforms, would seem to apply as forcefully to situations involving violations of international economic
rights as it does to situations involving violations of human rights.
A second reason why IIAs may negatively affect the rule of
law and good governance at the domestic level is their potential to
distort governance. IIAs give greater weight to the voice and inter81. See, e.g., MAVLUDA SATTOROVA, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATY LAW ON
HOST SATES: ENABLING GOOD GOVERNANCE? 58–61 (2018); see also BONNITCHA supra note
28, at 136 (discussing studies); Gulnaz Sharafutdinova & Karen Dawisha, The Escape from
Institution-Building in a Globalized World: Lessons from Russia, 15 PERSP. ON POL. 361,
364, 369–71 (2017) (discussing international arbitration, not limited to treaty-based
arbitration).
82. Bernard Robertson, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Human Rights
Litigation: The Burden of Proof Reconsidered, 39 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 191, 196 (1990).
83. Id.
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ests of investors, potentially at the expense of other stakeholders, and
provide covered investors access to privileged and powerful protections and legal mechanisms to challenge state conduct that negatively
impacts the rights or expectations of their investments. These enhanced protections and powers, in turn, threaten core aspects of SDG
16, 84 including principles of equality before the law and efforts to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decisionmaking. This Part (A.1, A.2, and A.3) addresses these issues, focusing on the distortionary effects of treaties’ substantive protections
and enforcement mechanisms, and on the similar distortions that can
be caused by IIAs’ implicit and explicit notice-and-comment rules, as
well as potential reforms to better align IIAs with efforts to promote
good governance.
1. Distortion Through Substantive Protections and ISDS Enforcement
ISDS undermines principles of equality before the law where
covered investors have, through substantive protections enforceable
through ISDS, a uniquely powerful tool that can be employed at the
expense of other stakeholders. We have argued that IIAs can increase inequality by:
(1) providing unequal procedural rights for protection
of wholly or partially foreign-owned firms, providing
them greater power than other stakeholders both with
respect to relations with the host state government,
and in connection with disputes with other private parties; and (2) providing those foreign firms greater substantive standards of protection that strengthen the legal force of their economic rights and “expectations,”
with potentially negative impacts on competing rights
and interests held by others. 85
These inequalities provided under the law can entrench and
exacerbate inequalities in economic, social, and political terms. The
Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”) standard, for instance, which
84. SDG 16 commits states to “[p]romote peaceful and inclusive societies for
sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable
and inclusive institutions at all levels.” 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, supra
note 1, SDG 16. Relevant targets include, “[p]romot[ing] the rule of law at the national and
international levels and ensur[ing] equal access to justice for all,” id. Target 16.3,
“[e]nsur[ing] responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all
levels,” id. Target 16.7, and “promot[ing] and enforc[ing] non-discriminatory laws and
policies for sustainable development.” Id. Target 16 B.
85. Sachs & Johnson, supra note 9, at 2.
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has been used to enforce protections of investors’ legitimate expectations and favors stability over change, stands to significantly constrain states’ abilities to adapt policy frameworks to fight inequality.
Investors often have used FET provisions to challenge measures “to
combat three of the most inequality-inducing effects that can arise
from property rights systems—negative externalities, abusive practices of monopoly rights holders, and undue appropriation of
gains.” 86 Investors have also used ISDS to challenge the attempts of
traditionally marginalized voices to assert legal and political power. 87
Beyond simply allocating rights unequally among stakeholders, IIAs’
substantive provisions and ISDS enforcement mechanisms further
entrench inequalities by protecting an unequal status quo against
more equal and redistributionist structures and objectives.
Studies have noted, for instance, that indigenous peoples, and
indigenous women in particular, face especially severe challenges in
having their voices heard and rights protected by central governments
in connection with decisions regarding development of natural resources projects. 88 While they may have formal rights to participate
in governance processes and bring legal challenges to halt or shape
the design and impacts of such projects, too often those rights are either practically difficult to exercise or, when asserted, not given due
legal effect. In contrast, under investment treaties, a number of tribunals have ruled that, if an investor seeking to develop an extractive
industry project secures favorable representations or assurances from
federal or central government officials regarding the investor’s proposed project, it can then use ISDS to enforce 89 those “commitments”
86. Id. at 2.
87. See, e.g., Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 152–83 (Nov. 30, 2017). See also Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v.
Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case Repository No. 2012-2 ¶¶ 1.105–1.106 (2016).
88. See generally INDIGENOUS NAVIGATOR: ALARMING TRENDS AND CASES,
http://nav.indigenousnavigator.com/index.php/en/data-trends-and-cases (last visited Oct. 21,
2019). See also Sarah Morales, Digging for Rights: How Can International Human Rights
Law Better Protect Indigenous Women from Extractive Industries?, 31 CAN. J. OF WOMEN L.
58, 74–77 (2019) (noting particular challenges faced by women in participating in
consultation and decision-making processes); Sheena Kennedy Dalseg et al., Gendered
Environmental Assessments in the Canadian North: Marginalization of Indigenous Women
and Traditional Economies, 47 N. REV. 135 (2018) (assessing the participation of
indigenous women in environmental assessments of natural resource projects in Canada);
Riccarda Flemmer & Almut Schilling Vacaflor, Unfulfilled Promises of the Consultation
Approach: The Limits to Effective Indigenous Participation in Bolivia’s and Peru’s
Extractive Industries, 37 THIRD WORLD Q. 172 (2016) (reviewing challenges in participating
in governance processes and articulating and securing preferred outcomes).
89. Generally, the investor’s request will be for compensation in the event those
“commitments” are later reneged upon. Thus, the actual claim may not be for enforcement
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or signals irrespective of whether they were valid and binding under
domestic law. 90 These ISDS decisions fail to recognize or grapple
with the implications that such heighted protection of representations
to investors can have on the competing claims, rights, power, and
voice of non-parties, such as indigenous communities living near the
proposed project. 91
Treaties thus can signal to investors that they should focus on
engaging with and stockpiling evidence of affirmative support from
those central agencies and officials most favorably inclined toward
their proposals. Similarly, treaties can signal to governments that the
“expectations” of investors demand more attention than the rights
and expectations of other stakeholders. Moreover, when there is a
contest among levels or branches of government (local vs. central,
mining ministry vs. environmental ministry, or executive vs. judiciary) about whether to approve and how to govern such projects, these
substantive and procedural aspects of investment treaties can potentially influence the outcomes of those contests in pro-investor directions. If the outcome of such contests is not what the investor desired, it can then use the treaty to challenge that outcome.

or specific performance of the commitment, but for monetary damages to compensate for
non-adherence to the commitment. However, the line between enforcement of a
commitment and requirement of compensation for non-adherence is not always clear. For
instance, the award of compensation may cause or encourage a state to abide by the
commitment. Additionally, if the commitment is to provide a financial benefit (e.g., a tax
incentive) then an award of compensation may be functionally similar to an order to abide
by the commitment.
90. Lise Johnson, A Fundamental Shift in Power: Permitting International Investors to
Convert their Economic Expectations into Rights, supra note 38, at 118–20; see also Lise
Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State ‘Commitments’ and the
Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361, 372–75 (2013).
91. See, e.g., Bear Creek v. Peru, supra note 87. In that case, the representations
consisted largely of national-level government acquiescence to the investor’s conduct in
developing its mining project, and to national-level failure to challenge or contest the
adequacy of the investor’s environmental and consultation plans. Because national officials
had given implicit and limited explicit assurances regarding the project’s compliance with
domestic law, the tribunal determined that the government was not later able to challenge the
legitimacy of the project without running afoul of the investment treaty. Id. ¶¶ 411–14.
There had been local-level challenges to the legitimacy of the project and approval process,
but those did not prevent the tribunal from determining that the government had effectively
acquiesced to and supported the project’s legality. Cf. id. ¶¶ 409, 411–14. See also Copper
Mesa v. Ecuador, supra note 87, ¶ 5.63 (rejecting the respondent state’s unclean hands
arguments on the ground that the respondent had not raised those issues until after
commencement of the arbitration. Notably, however, and as the award details, allegations
about the wrongful nature of the investor’s conduct and proposed project had been raised by
local government officials and communities in the events leading up to the arbitration).

(f) Johnson et al (58-1) (Do Not Delete)

86

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

11/27/2019 2:08 PM

[58:1

In the course of ISDS proceedings, individuals and communities affected by the relevant investment have no legal right to participate in or shape the proceedings. In many ISDS disputes, investors’
claims can negatively affect the direct and indirect beneficiaries of
the challenged government measures, 92 and in some ISDS cases, the
investors’ claims for relief purposefully aim to attack the rights of
non-parties. 93 That individuals, communities and other interested
parties are not able to participate in the proceedings can cause arbitrators to base their decisions on a narrow and incomplete view of the
law and facts, and produce decisions that shape the law so as to be
disproportionately and unduly attentive to only investor claimants’
economic interests. 94
Not only are non-parties unable to participate in the proceedings, but very often the affected individuals or communities, as well
as domestic shareholders in the investment or creditors who may be
affected by the treaty claims and/or their outcomes, may not (whether
by order of the tribunal or practical limitations) be able to follow developments in the arbitration, and may not even know the outcome of
settled or resolved disputes. Although progress has been made to increase transparency of investor-state arbitration through adoption of
the UN Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”)
Rules on Transparency and United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (the “Mauritius Convention”), 95 disputes under most existing IIAs can still be litigated
92. The claims, for instance, may negatively impact users of infrastructure services
when the claims are about appropriate tariffs that can be charged or similar issues; local
communities living around extractive industry projects when the ISDS claim is used to
challenge permit denials or conditions; and taxpayers when, for instance, the ISDS claim
challenges a withdrawal or reduction in government subsidies. These are just a few
examples.
93. See, e.g., Claimants’ Memorial on the Merits ¶ 547, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of
Ecuador, PCA Case Repository No. 2009-23 (Sept. 6, 2010); see also Renco Grp. v.
Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/1, Award, ¶ 17 (Nov. 9, 2016); Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Gov’t of Can., UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Award, ¶ 467 (Mar. 16, 2017).
94. Insulating the arbitrators in this manner from input by non-parties may also
increase the likelihood that ISDS tribunals’ decisions reflect economic and legal worldviews
commonly shared by arbitrators, such as belief in the soundness of the policy prescriptions
pronounced by the Washington Consensus. See, e.g., David Chriki, Is the Washington
Consensus Really Dead? An Empirical Analysis of FET Claims in Investment Arbitration, 41
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.REV. 292, 304–06 (2018).
95. G.A. Res. 69/116, U.N. Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based InvestorState Arbitration (Dec. 10, 2014). Notably, for disputes filed under treaties concluded
before April 1, 2014, the Rules on Transparency only apply if (1) the investor and state have
agreed to the Rules’ application, or (2) the two state parties to the underlying treaty have
agreed to the Rules’ application. The Mauritius Convention on Transparency was drafted as
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and resolved behind closed doors. 96 Indeed, only a handful of countries have committed to adhere to the Rules on Transparency through
unilateral declarations, or ratified the Mauritius Convention, which
was drafted in order to effectively and efficiently ensure application
of the Transparency Rules. 97
2. Distortion Through Express and Implied Notice-and-Comment IIA
Rules
The issues outlined above are compounded by investment
treaties’ express and implied notice-and-comment rules. Increasingly, IIAs (1) impose requirements on governments to publish advance
notice of proposed actions, and (2) respond to questions and comments received from foreign investors and other constituents. 98 Such
a means to facilitate state consent to application of the Rules on Transparency.
96. Unless the relevant arbitration rules or the treaty dictates otherwise, the disputing
parties can agree, and/or the tribunal can determine, how open or closed an ISDS proceeding
will be. Secrecy, in whole or part, remains common. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2017, in 2 INT’L INV. AGREEMENTS ISSUES
1,
2
(2018),
available
at
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
NOTES
diaepcbinf2018d2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTE2-N67V].
Although awards are
increasingly made public, the arbitration can remain shielded from public view while it is
pending. Even if the existence of the claim is known prior to an award being rendered,
submissions detailing the parties’ factual and legal arguments commonly are not public (and
commonly remain non-public even after the award has been issued).
97. As of January 21, 2019, the United Nations Treaty Collection reported that there
were 23 signatories to the Mauritius Convention and 5 parties. Data on signatures and
ratifications is available at Depositary: Status of Treaties: United Nations Convention on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXII-3&chapter=22&
clang=_en [https://perma.cc/9J4C-PKG8] (last updated Sept. 28, 2018).
98. See, e.g., Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Between the European
Union and Its Member States, Of the One Part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, Of the
Other Part, art. 30, Dec. 21, 2015 (requiring each party to “ensure that its procedures for the
development of technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures allow for public
consultation of interested parties at an early appropriate stage when comments resulting from
the public consultation can still be introduced and taken into account”); Agreement for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Mong., art. 12, Sept. 8, 2016 (directing
parties, to the extent possible, to publish regulatory proposals and provide interested persons
and the other Party a reasonable opportunity to comment on such proposed measures.”); U.S.
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 11(2)-(3), 2012, https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FHX8X5Y3] [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT]. It should be pointed out that a couple of factors soften
requirements regarding advance publication of proposed rules and obligations to respond to
comments. For one, several treaties only oblige governments to publish information “to the
extent possible.” Additionally, violations of these articles generally cannot be directly raised
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codification of notice-and-comment rules in IIAs, even if not directly
enforceable under the treaties, 99 can also be used to support claims
for breach of other standards such as the FET obligation. 100 Additionally, even where not expressly incorporated into the text of the
IIA, requirements of advance notice, and, in some cases, an opportunity to respond, have been interpreted as forming part of the FET
obligation. 101 On one hand, these obligations may be expected to advance the rule of law and to improve government transparency, accountability, and decision-making. On the other hand, they risk
providing undue space for non-agency actors, including foreign investors, to determine the shape and fate of proposed regulatory actions through submission of public comments, private communications, and/or other lobbying activities. This, in turn, raises concerns
about government capture.
There is considerable debate about the problem of government capture: where and in what circumstances it exists, how to identify it, whether and to what extent it is a problem, and, if so, how to
combat it. Debates on this subject may be less straightforward than

by investors in investor-state arbitration (though they may support allegations that a country
has breached another article such as the article on fair and equitable treatment. See also
UNCTAD, SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II:
TRANSPARENCY 16–30 (2012).
99. See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 98. The U.S. Model BIT does not permit
ISDS claims for breach of the “Transparency” article (i.e., Article 11).
100. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 76 (Aug. 30, 2000) (interpreting the NAFTA’s FET obligation as
containing an obligation of transparency and determining that the government had breached
that obligation). Mexico subsequently challenged the award in Canada; and the Canadian
court annulled aspects of the award, determining, in relevant part, that the tribunal had
exceeded its authority when interpreting the FET obligation to incorporate transparency
requirements. See Howard Mann, Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: KEY CASES FROM 20002010, at 72, 75–80 (Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Lise Johnson eds., 2011). While it
is questionable whether transparency is an element of the FET obligation in NAFTA and
other treaties similarly tying the FET obligation to the minimum standard of treatment,
transparency has been considered to be an element of the FET obligation in disputes under
other IIAs. See, e.g., Deutsche Telekom v. India, PCA Case Repository No. 2014-10,
UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 336, (Dec. 13, 2017).
101. See UNCTAD, supra note 96, at 52–55. Cases interpreting the FET obligation to
include such requirements of advance notice and/or an opportunity to respond are
controversial, however, and have been subjected to critique and successful legal challenges.
Cf. Metalclad Corp., supra note 100, at 27 (finding a breach of the FET obligation based, in
part, on a lack of transparency); The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001
B.C.S.C. 664, ¶ 76 (B.C. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2001) (accepting a challenge to the tribunal’s
reasoning and holding on transparency being an element of the FET standard).
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they appear on their face. For example, some have argued that the
business community potentially affected by a proposed measure has
the most accurate information regarding the design and merits of the
proposal, and therefore should have outside influence in the regulatory process. Others, however, have noted the potential for “nefarious
influence by business or economic interests on regulatory outputs to
the detriment of the ‘public interest’ or ‘public good.’” 102 In this
sense, agency capture is “shorthand for the phenomenon whereby
regulated entities wield their superior capabilities to secure favorable
agency outcomes at the expense of the diffuse public.” 103
To a certain extent, issues of the latter, nefarious face of
agency capture are already echoed in concerns raised about the
chilling effect that investment treaties may have on states. Those
concerned about regulatory chill argue that foreign investors can and
do use the threat of investor-state arbitration to direct regulators’ actions toward their business interests and away from the interests of
the general public. For a number of reasons, evidence of the pervasiveness of this problematic practice is hard to gather; yet its existence has been documented. 104 Notice-and-comment requirements are
likely to increase the incidence and effectiveness of “chilling” efforts.
102. Susan W. Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory
Policymaking, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND
HOW TO LIMIT IT 292, 296 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014).
103. Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010).
104. Investors can invoke the threat of an ISDS case, either subtly or directly, in private
conversations with policy makers or through other non-public means, making it difficult to
capture both specific instances of and the scale of such regulatory chill. Certain examples
are known if, for instance, communications are leaked, a notice of claim is filed and
subsequently revoked when the government reverses its policy, or a policy maker attests to
the impact of such a threat. See, e.g., Mavluda Sattorova, Investor Responsibilities from a
Host State Perspective: Qualitative Data and Proposals for Treaty Reform, 113 AJIL
UNBOUND 22, 22–24 (2019); Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, Reconceptualizing ISDS:
When is IP an Investment and How Much Can States Regulate It? 11–12 (N.Y.U., Pub. L. &
Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-23, 2018); Glivec in Colombia: New
Leaked Letter from Novartis Attests to Pressure at the Highest Level, PUBLIC EYE (Feb. 5,
2018), https://www.publiceye.ch/en/news/detail/glivec-in-colombia-new-leaked-letter-fromnovartis-attests-to-pressure-at-highest-level [https://perma.cc/6PE9-PN62]; Brook Baker &
Katrina Geddes, The Incredible Shrinking Victory: Eli Lilly v. Canada, Success, Judicial
Reversal, and Continuing Threats from Pharmaceutical ISDS, 49 LOYOLA U. CHI. L. J. 479,
480 (2017); Krzysztof J. Pelc, What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State
Disputes, 71 INT’L ORG. 557, 559 (2017); van Harten & Scott, supra note 11, at 92. For
discussions of regulatory chill, including the different forms it may take, and the methods
and challenges for documenting it, see Pohl, supra note 6, at 55–66; Kyla Tienhaara,
Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606, 606 (Chester Brown &
Kate Miles eds., 2011).
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Whatever one’s view of agency capture in the domestic context, and the role of notice-and-comment procedures in that context,
there are several reasons why including notice-and-comment requirements in investment treaties (or interpreting those requirements
to be a part of IIAs’ FET obligations) can risk exacerbating problematic patterns of corporate capture. One factor relates to the issue of
regulatory chill noted above. In the domestic context, non-agency
actors may be able to pursue litigation against the government to
challenge an agency’s final decisions regarding a rule, arguing, for
instance, that the decision-making process did not comply with notice-and-comment procedures. And when deciding whether and how
to adopt the rule, the likelihood of such a legal challenge can impact
the agency’s conduct. Nevertheless, the remedy available in such legal challenges—and therefore the force of the litigation threat—is
generally restricted to a modification or rejection of the rule or ruleformulation process, not monetary damages. In contrast, in the international investment law sphere, an investor can raise the threat of investor-state arbitration (and the often-high legal fees, expenses, liability, and reputational risks associated with it) in challenges to
proposed agency actions and processes of rule-formulation. The
threat of financial liability that ISDS can inject into notice-andcomment procedures may influence the outcomes of rule-making
processes in ways that administrative notice-and-comment mechanisms do not.
Including express or implied rules on notice-and-comment in
IIAs also strengthens the tools available to investors to challenge
government measures. In addition to being susceptible to claims under substantive IIA protections (such as the FET clause) on the
ground that they unduly interfere with investors’ economic rights, interests, or expectations, government decisions can also be subject to
challenge on the ground that they were not adopted with due consideration of relevant input. 105 Moreover, even if an agency complied
with domestic notice-and-comment rules, that would not prevent the
state from being held liable on the ground that it failed to give the investor adequate notice of and opportunity to respond to the relevant
105. See, e.g., Bear Creek v. Peru, supra note 87, ¶¶ 436(iii), 526 (challenging the
government’s decision for, among other reasons, being taken without notice to the investor
and an opportunity to be heard); Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, supra note 87, ¶ 8.8 (finding that
the government had violated the treaty’s expropriation and FET provisions by issuing
Termination Resolutions without first giving the claimant notice of or an opportunity to
challenge its intended actions; and awarding compensation for sunk costs, less 30 percent
due to the investor’s contributory fault); TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Guatemala,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, ¶¶ 457–58 (Dec. 19, 2013) (finding that the government
violated the minimum standard of treatment by failing to give reasons for its decisions).
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regulatory conduct. 106
A key concern about notice-and-comment rules in (or interpreted to be part of) IIA standards relates to power dynamics. Studies have shown that business interests may be particularly influential
stakeholders in administrative agenda-setting and rule-making processes, and that their relative influence as compared to other groups
and individuals may further expand in contexts where public interest
advocates (i.e., advocates for consumer rights, environmental protection, and social justice) are less active. 107 Because public interest advocates in developing countries are generally weaker and less wellfunded than their developed-country counterparts and regulated industry actors, these dynamics could create a situation where business
interests wield a disproportionately significant and particularly undesirable degree of influence over developing country agency actors to
the detriment of broader public interests. If IIAs impose notice-andcomment mandates but are not accompanied by efforts to increase the
capacity and/or rights of other stakeholders to participate in those
processes, then IIAs risk creating or magnifying disparities in the
voice and power that private industry actors have in law-setting processes relative to public interest organizations and individuals. These
disparities then grow larger when industry actors have access to
ISDS.
This is not to say that international regimes on transparency
and notice-and-comment systems should be avoided. To the contrary, public engagement on policy making can ensure a range of perspectives are heard and considered. However, as we have seen, with
unequal resources, access, and interests—and unclear rules regarding
who can provide input, when, and how—participatory processes can
106. See, e.g., Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, supra note 87, ¶ 6.69 (“It is no answer for the
Respondent to assert that no such compensation, legal remedy or administrative review were
permitted, in theory, under the Mining Mandate or otherwise under its national laws: the
Treaty, to which the Respondent had voluntarily agreed, imposed higher standards as a
matter of international law.”).
107. See, e.g., William T. Gormley, Alternative Models of the Regulatory Process:
Public Utility Regulation in the States, 35 W. POL. Q. 297, 299 (1982); William F. West &
Connor Raso, Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implications for Bureaucratic
Responsiveness and Bureaucratic Control, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 495, 498,
508–10 (2013); Susan Webb Yackee, Assessing Regulatory Participation by Health
Professionals: A Study of State Health Rulemaking, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 105, 106 (2013);
Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda Building and
Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 373, 377 (2012);
William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules and the Limits
of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576, 578 (2009); Jason W. Yackee & Susan W.
Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S.
Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 128 (2006).
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be captured or heavily influenced by certain more powerful economic
interests. 108 To the extent that cooperation is considered useful for
promoting open governance, careful consideration is advised as to the
right instruments or modalities to support such cooperation, and how
an open, participatory processes can best avoid agency capture by
special interests.
3. Opportunities to Promote Good Governance and Mitigate
Distortion Risk
Overall, through their privileged procedural and substantive
protections for covered investors, IIAs risk distorting government
policy-making in ways that are particularly responsive to the interests
of foreign investors, potentially at the expense of the interests of other stakeholders. This, in turn, threatens key aspects of the SDGs and
may further erode public faith in government institutions as protectors of the powerless as well as the powerful.
IIAs could, however, be designed to avoid these issues and
make positive contributions to SDG 16. They could, for instance, integrate mechanisms to identify and address challenges faced both by
investors and, crucially, by other stakeholders relating to governance
of investments. 109 For instance, to the extent that governments want
to bolster and regularize opportunities for input when developing
regulations, mechanisms could be designed to ensure that a more diverse set of stakeholders—and not simply regulated entities—have
meaningful opportunities to provide relevant information to policy108. Deserai A. Crow, Elizabeth A. Albright & Elizabeth Koebele, Environmental
Rulemaking Across States: Process, Procedural Access, and Regulatory Influence, 34
ENVTL. & PLAN. C: POL. & SPACE 1222, 1223–24, 1236 (2016) (based on research on
regulatory practices in several U.S. states, finding support for their hypotheses that
“technical expertise, procedural access, and relationships with regulators give some
stakeholders (particularly industry) greater access and influence over rulemaking,”); West &
Raso, supra note 107, at 508 (finding that “the degree to which business and professional
groups dominated other nongovernmental interests” in shaping the rulemaking agenda “is
striking”); West, supra note 107, at 591–92 (raising concerns about informal, preliminary
stages in rulemaking processes that precede formal statutory notice-and-comment
procedures, and tensions with openness, inclusiveness, and democratic values that those
early phases may generate); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal
Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 397 (2007).
109. See, e.g., Richard C. Chen, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Domestic
Institutional Reform, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 547, 583 (2017) (discussing some
relevant options, including using BITs to strengthen the ability of domestic legal systems to
effectively resolve investment disputes, and establishing ombudsmen-type systems to
identify and address investment-related challenges).
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makers through context- and country-appropriate means where such
input is desirable. Treaty parties could, for instance, commit to improving the capability of governments to manage robust multistakeholder environmental and social impact assessment processes,
which can be crucial for ensuring the long-term sustainability and
even basic financial viability of major investment projects. 110 Such
initiatives could include, in particular, providing support for civil society to follow and provide input into these processes, and to help
monitor and enforce government and investor compliance with relevant legal requirements. 111
To the extent that investor or other stakeholder concerns relate to unduly slow administrative or judicial proceedings, parties
could cooperate to identify bottlenecks and provide financial or other
resources to improve efficiency for the benefit of all relevant domestic and international actors rather than supporting foreign investors to
bypass domestic institutions and processes. In this context, ensuring
that such initiatives consider impacts on stakeholders other than covered investors, and on interests other than covered investors’ economic and property rights, is essential. Narrow agendas that do not
address these broader concerns and interests have problematically
plagued other international work on investment climate reform, 112
110. Jesse Coleman, Brooke Güven, Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, What Do We Mean by
Investment Facilitation?, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. (Feb. 21, 2018),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2018/02/22/what-do-we-mean-by-investment-facilitation/
[https://perma.cc/C7SX-GMY6].
111. There are some examples of such activities. In connection with the Dominican
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”), for
instance, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) is working to help
“strengthen the implementation of inclusive public participation and availability of
information within existing national [environmental impact assessment (“EIA”)]
frameworks.” Relatedly, the EPA had also provided technical assistance to environmental
officials regarding preparation of EIAs, and supported a 2013-2018 “public participation
program” aiming “to create a network of trained public participation experts in the region,
and to use public participation, education and outreach to engage communities in
environmental decision-making processes to help enforce environmental laws.” CapacityBuilding Programs Under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free
PROT.
AGENCY,
Trade
Agreement
(CAFTA-DR),
U.S.
ENVTL.
https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/capacity-building-programs-under-dominican
-republic-central-america-united#pp-eia [https://perma.cc/B386-PPWD] (last visited Jan. 21,
2019). See, e.g., D. Brent Edwards et al., The National Politics of Educational Advocacy in
the Context of Global Governance: International Funding and Support for Civil Society
Engagement in Cambodia, 48 COMPARE 171, 172 (2018) (discussing multilateral support of
civil society in other contexts).
112. See, e.g., the report of the Independent Evaluation Group (“IEG”) of the World
Bank Group assessing the World Bank’s Groups support for reform of business regulations.
After reviewing all projects in the investment climate portfolio, the IEG concluded, among
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and do not reflect the need for policy coherence called for and essential to the SDGs.
B. IIAs and Policy Space to Regulate Investments
In addition to these institutional concerns about voice, access,
representation, and power in policy-making processes, IIAs’ substantive and procedural investment protections hinder governments’
abilities to implement and enforce policies to ensure that covered investments generate benefits, not harms, in the state parties. As explained above, whether FDI contributes to sustainable development
depends on the ability of governments to adopt and enforce public interest regulations. For that reason, it is essential that states evaluate
the effects of IIAs on their ability to regulate in the public interest.
The following sections examine the ways in which IIAs constrain
states’ relevant domestic policy space (B.1) as well as opportunities
for states to reform IIAs to avoid many of these concerning constraints (B.2).
1. Constraints on Policy Space
The ability to regulate has both inherent normative value—
SDG 16 recognizes the need for strong and accountable democratic
institutions 113—as well as instrumental value to achieve all other
SDGs and associated targets. Regulation is essential for sustainable
development, including to ensure that investors pay their fair share in
taxes, treat their workers justly and humanely, and do not have undue
negative impacts on the environment. Thus, as called for by target
17.15 of SDG 17, international governance should “respect each
country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development.” 114
Governments need policy space to be able to enact, implement, revise, and refine their policies, laws, and regulations in order
to achieve sustainable development objectives. Unsurprisingly, these
objectives, and the optimal and feasible means for meeting them,
other things, that in that work, “[b]usiness stakeholders are treated as paramount;
nonbusiness stakeholders are barely visible.” IEG, INVESTMENT CLIMATE REFORMS: AN
INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF WORLD BANK GROUP SUPPORT TO REFORMS OF BUSINESS
REGULATIONS xxiv (2015). This, in turn, led to a distorted and potentially misleading
assessment of the social value of the World Bank’s interventions.
113. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 25.
114. Id. at 27.
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may evolve over time with changing needs and circumstances, and
governments need to be able to respond to these changes. Recognizing that the roles of different government actors vary between countries, this flexibility to respond may require, for example, that: legislatures be empowered to enact or amend purposeful legislation;
executive officials be able to set policies and priorities and exercise
discretion where appropriate; and administrative and judicial courts
be free to give meaning to laws and regulations, rule on the scope of
public and private rights and obligations, and invalidate or impose
penalties on illegal or otherwise wrongful conduct.
While international law to some degree inherently constrains
domestic policy space, 115 it is important to consider carefully when,
why and how international law should do so. This can be illustrated
through a comparison with international trade law. 116 The international trading system constrains domestic law and policy in order to
limit protectionism. 117 It justifies these constraints on the grounds
that economic protectionism, while potentially beneficial for some
countries (or certain interests within them, and over certain time horizons), is, as a general matter, unwise economic policy. International rules can help to restrain individual countries’ beggar-thy-neighbor
impulses and prisoners’ dilemmas, and to enable governments to
withstand pressure from powerful domestic special interest groups to
impose self-interested protectionist measures. Thus, international
trade treaties might be said to laudably constrain states’ “right to regulate” in order to curb protectionism. There is some debate about
when some protectionist policies may be desirable (e.g., local content
measures designed to help capture gains from FDI projects, measures
designed to provide public goods, or measures to support domestic
industrial growth, catalyze certain methods of production, or sustain
livelihoods), as well as questions about who gets to decide whether
something is inappropriately protectionist and on what grounds. 118
Nevertheless, the notion that international trade law rules are appropriate for constraining domestic protectionism is broadly and general115. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights
Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 588, 592–94 (2007) (discussing theories of why
governments agree to and are more or less likely to commit to treaties limiting freedom to
act).
116. Simon Lester, Talk of “Right to Regulate” Is Hurting the Trade Debate,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-lester/talk-of-aright-to-regula_b_7839680.html?guccounter=1 [https://perma.cc/K7VG-YQSQ].
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Bernard Hoekman & Niall Meagher, China-Electronic Payment Services:
discrimination, economic development, and the GATS, 13 WORLD TRADE REV. 409, 437–38
(2014).

(f) Johnson et al (58-1) (Do Not Delete)

96

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

11/27/2019 2:08 PM

[58:1

ly accepted.
Reflecting the difficulties in establishing the constraints on
domestic policy space that are and are not desirable, the World Trade
Organization’s rules preventing member states from treating foreign
investors less favorably than domestic investors only apply on a positive-list basis, meaning that they apply only if and to the extent that
WTO member states have affirmatively agreed to abide by those national treatment rules. This positive-list approach, which is enshrined
in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), allows
member states to retain policy space to maintain measures to pursue a
range of economic, social, and environmental policies that might otherwise be inconsistent with a national treatment obligation. 119
IIAs, however, go beyond those restraints. For one, the national treatment obligation applies on a negative list basis, meaning
that it applies to all foreign investors in all sectors and activities unless the state parties included effective carve-outs or exceptions.
Moreover, the broad protections in IIAs suggest a much more expansive view of when international law should constrain domestic policy
space. The provisions protecting foreign investors from discrimination on the basis of nationality are most analogous to what can be
seen in the trade context (and, indeed, restrictions on discrimination
against foreign investors are also included in the WTO’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services). 120 In other words, states and their
stakeholders may accept international rules preventing them from
privileging a domestically-owned company over a comparable foreign-owned one on account of its nationality.
Moreover, IIAs’ national treatment obligations have been interpreted to discipline domestic regulatory action and inaction even
when there has been neither de jure nor de facto discrimination on
account of nationality. 121 Instead, investors have succeeded in arguing that host states violate the non-discrimination obligations of their
IIAs when states treat any covered foreign investor differently from
like domestic investors, even if the disparate treatment is based on
grounds other than the foreign investors’ nationality, and did not result in enhancing the competitive position of domestic investors rela-

119. Id.
120. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. II, art. XVII, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
121. See Bilcon of Del. et. al. v. Government of Can., PCA Case Repository 2009-04,
Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Mar. 17, 2015); Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co.
v. Ecuador, London Ct. Int. Arb. Case No. UN 3467 (July 1, 2004).
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tive to foreign ones. 122 In relevant cases, ISDS tribunals have closely
scrutinized state policies and decisions, considering not whether the
challenged treatment was intentionally based on, or even a de facto
result of, the investor’s nationality. 123 Instead, tribunals have looked
at whether the host state authorities, in the tribunal’s view, had valid
reasons for treating one investor differently from another. 124 This
reaches far into domestic policy-making and implementation without
the clear justification of an anti-protectionist rule or other guiding
principle. 125
Additionally, IIAs go beyond anti-protectionist rules like the
national treatment obligation. They impose obligations that are much
more expansive in their reach and open-ended in their content, and
that rest on more controversial economic theories. 126 Perhaps the
most powerful provision of IIAs, the FET obligation raises difficult
questions about whether or why it justifies international disciplines
122. Bilcon v. Can., supra note 121; Occidental v. Ecuador, supra note 121. This
contrasts with the rule under the GATS. Under the GATS, measures that de facto treat
foreign investors less favorably than domestic investors will violate the national treatment
obligation only if they also modify the conditions of competition in favor of the domestic
investors. See GATS, supra note 120, art. XVII; Gilles Muller, Troubled Relationships
under the GATS: Tensions between Market Access (Article XVI), National Treatment
(Article XVII), and Domestic Regulation (Article VI), 16 WORLD TRADE REV 449, 463, 467
(2017).
123. GATS, supra note 120, art. XVII(1).
124. Bilcon v. Can., supra note 121, ¶ 724–25. See also Apotex Holdings v. U.S.,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award (Aug. 25, 2014). While the tribunal ultimately
sided with the United States in Apotex Holdings, its searching review of the justifications for
the challenged measure illustrates how the non-discrimination provisions can trigger close
and subjective scrutiny of the substantive merits of the government’s conduct.
125. The justification for anti-protectionist rules that apply in connection with crossborder trade in goods does not necessarily apply for cross-border flows of capital. Indeed,
states, which are largely interested in seeking rather than discriminating against foreign
investment, do not appear to need special rules protecting foreign investors against
discrimination. Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, Relative Treatment of
Aliens: Firm-level Evidence from Developing Countries 6 (Oxford Global Econ. Governance
Programme, Working Paper No. 2016/122, 2016), available at https://www.geg.
ox.ac.uk/publication/geg-wp-2016122-relative-treatment-aliens-firm-level-evidencedeveloping-countries [https://perma.cc/P6QG-J3SG]. Indeed, investors’ ISDS claims of
nationality-based discrimination are relatively rare, and success on those claims even rarer.
According to UNCTAD’s data, as of January 21, 2019, there have only been nine successful
claims based on the national treatment provision in investment treaties. The authors have
analyzed those successful national treatment claims. None involved a clear finding by the
tribunal that the investor had been discriminated against on account of its nationality.
126. See, e.g., David Chriki, Is the Washington Consensus Really Dead? An Empirical
Analysis of FET Claims in Investment Arbitration, 41 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 291,
303–06 (2018).
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and oversight of domestic policy choices and actions. As Simon
Lester has explained:
[I]nvestment rules . . . require regulations to be “fair
and equitable,” sometimes including an examination
of whether the regulations are arbitrary. Such rules
impose broad and vague constraints on how governments may act, and they do so in ways that are not
very clear to regulators. . . . More importantly, the
broader international rules intrude on every category
of regulation. They do not simply classify one particular policy goal (protectionism) that regulations might
pursue as off limits. Rather, they hold every policy
goal open to review under a standard that gives international courts a good deal of leeway in their review
of the regulation. 127
Such IIA-based review of measures alleged to be procedurally
or substantively arbitrary 128 or unfair raises a number of concerns. In
particular, it may unduly discourage new or strengthened regulations,
or enforcement of existing rules. Given that such challenges can only
be brought by covered investors, ISDS claims will likely only contest
government action (or inaction) that is adverse to economic interests,
potentially driving asymmetrical development of the law in favor of
those economic interests and to the detriment of regulatory powers or
agendas serving competing aims. The meanings of “arbitrariness”
and “unfairness” are imprecise and subjective, giving great power to
both investors to threaten suits and to the final adjudicators to determine the FET standard’s contours. 129 Tribunals have interpreted this
FET obligation to allow them to scrutinize whether domestic
measures are inconsistent with alleged norms of legal stability, 130 in127. Lester, supra note 116.
128. A reviewing court may determine that a decision is procedurally arbitrary if no
reasons were offered by the decision-maker to evidence that it considered the relevant issues
of law and fact. A reviewing court may determine that a decision is substantively arbitrary if
it deems the decision to be unreasonable or irrational in light of the policy goals it considers
relevant. Even scrutiny of procedural arbitrariness can have important implications for
substantive regulatory outcomes, for instance by raising the cost of regulation and its
vulnerability to litigation.
129. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 762–68 (2008).
130. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and
Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (Oct.
5, 2012); Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 93, ¶¶ 387–89 (finding that the claimant had failed
to provide evidence demonstrating that the change in the law had been dramatic enough to
establish liability, and thereby supporting the notion that investors could prevail on claims
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vestors’ allegedly legitimate expectations of future business prospects, and investors’ reliance on specific commitments or promises
given by government officials. 131
Accordingly, IIAs offer expansive opportunities for international scrutiny of domestic law, policy, action, and inaction, irrespective of the purpose of the challenged conduct. Governments can be
(and have been) held liable even for good faith conduct intended to
address and improve social, environmental, and economic issues
when the government’s conduct intentionally or unintentionally interferes with the rights or expectations of covered foreign investors.
The public interest aim or intent of the measure is not a bar to claims
or a defense to liability. 132
While investment treaties are often justified on the ground
that they are needed to protect investors against intentional expropriations or discriminatory abuses by authoritarian leaders or ineffective or corrupt judicial systems, 133 the reality is that most treaty
claims are not based on such acts. Rather, claims are frequently
brought to challenge administrative decisions relating to interpretation or application of domestic law or policy, without first raising the
challenge before domestic judicial or administrative systems. ISDS
claims are also used to contest court decisions (even decisions where
there is no suggestion of improper conduct by judicial officials) and
laws. These challenges relatively rarely allege intentionally wrongchallenging “dramatic” changes in the law, including shifts in the law produced by court
decisions in common law systems).
131. Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State
‘Commitments’ and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361,
411–13 (2013); Lise Johnson, A Fundamental Shift in Power: Permitting International
Investors to Convert their Economic Expectations into Rights, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 106,
110–111, 112 (2018); Johnson et al., supra note 76.
132. Clear examples of this are the relatively high-profile cases Philip Morris brought
against Australia and Uruguay. See, e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd v. Austl., PCA Case
Repository 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015); Philip Morris
Brands Sàrl v. Uru., ICSID Case No ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016). There was no
suggestion that the challenged measures were adopted for anything other than a legitimate
public purpose. Yet neither case was considered frivolous or easily dismissed.
133. See, e.g., Shayerah Ilias Akhtar et al., International Investment Agreements (IIAs):
Frequently Asked Questions 13 (Congressional Research Service Report R44015, May 15,
2015) (noting the importance of ISDS for relief where courts are corrupt, newly formed, or
lack independence); United States Trade Representative, The Facts on Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, TRADEWINDS BLOG (Mar. 2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/blog/2014/March/Facts-Investor-State%20Dispute-SettlementSafeguarding-Public-Interest-Protecting-Investors [https://perma.cc/G45J-KDVT] (saying
investment protections are needed to protect against “discrimination, repudiation of
contracts, and expropriation”).
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ful, discriminatory or bad faith conduct by the government, and even
more rarely establish that any such conduct would not have been addressed by the domestic courts or administrative processes. This
suggests that rather than serving as a shield of last resort, investment
treaties are frequently used as “swords” to contest constraints on private sector prerogatives, and challenge domestic law and policy outside of normal channels.
Indeed, investment treaty disputes frequently go to the heart
of complex issues in domestic law and policy, including the appropriate balance between private and public rights and interests, and
strategies for both ensuring that FDI (and other economic activities)
is appropriately encouraged and appropriately regulated and taxed.
Examples include:
• issues relating to how environmental impact assessments are conducted and to what extent concerns by
local communities relating to projects are to be taken
into account;
• issues relating to the processes for setting tariffs for
water, electricity, or other public services, and outcomes of those processes;
• questions relating to appropriate and sustainable fiscal
policies, including issues of incentives for and assessments against firms;
• decisions regarding what is and is not a protected
property right;
• decisions regarding what is and is not an enforceable
contract or contractual provision; and
• decisions regarding the respective protections for
debtors and creditors (including involuntary creditors
such as victims of environmental torts) in circumstances of insolvency.
While some recent agreements contain express provisions
protecting a “right to regulate,” 134 it is unclear whether these types of
provisions will have any meaningful effect in terms of narrowing in-

134. See, e.g., CETA art. 8.9(1), Oct. 30, 2016; Agreement on the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Rwanda-U.A.E., art. 9, Nov. 1, 2017,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5722/
download [https://perma.cc/WR77-A4YP]; Peru-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Austl.Peru, art. 8.18, Feb. 12, 2018, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-inforce/pafta/full-text/Pages/fta-text-and-associated-documents.aspx [https://perma.cc/EY7323WV].
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terpretations of IIAs’ investment protections. Some of these provisions are conditioned by language saying that the “right to regulate”
only protects measures “otherwise consistent with the” investment
treaty’s obligations. 135 Even in treaties without such self-canceling
language, there are questions about whether and when “right to regulate” provisions actually prevent liability for regulatory measures
otherwise breaching the treaty, or simply make clear that the governments may adopt and maintain the measure but still must pay
compensation if it violates a treaty obligation. 136 Any “right to regulate” provision, even if not limited by an “otherwise consistent with
this chapter” clause, would be subject to the subjective assessment of
its legitimacy by the tribunal, especially if the measure were discriminatory in intent or effect. The lingering fundamental question, therefore, is what the limits on the “right to regulate” are.
Crucially for the issue of policy space, the balance ISDS tribunals have struck between private rights and expectations, on one
hand, and public rights and interests, on the other, is often different
from and more protective of private property than the balance struck
in many domestic legal systems. 137 As referred to above, a growing
135. See, e.g., Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership, art. 9.16, Feb. 4, 2016, available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/TransPacific-Partnership/Text/9.-Investment-Chapter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GA3M-4A6M]
[hereinafter CPTPP].
136. Compare CPTPP, supra note 135, art. 9.16, with CETA, supra note 69, art. 8.9(4).
Both contain a phrase stating that nothing in the agreement shall be construed to prevent a
Party from doing X. CETA Article 8.9(4) also makes clear that if a Party does X, it shall not
be ordered to award compensation. This raises the question of whether the absence of such
language in CPTPP article 9.16 means that compensation may still be ordered for measures
covered by that right to regulate provision.
137. See, e.g., Johnson & Volkov, supra note 131, at 164 (stating that published cases
indicate that investor-state arbitral tribunals hold governments to stricter standards of
noninterference with investor-state contracts than do U.S. domestic courts); Jan
Kleinheisterkamp, Who is Afraid of Investor-State Arbitration? Or Comparative Law? 1, 3
(LSE L. Pol’y Briefing Papers, June 2014) (claiming that if future European Union
agreements are framed on the lines of existing BITs then investors could obtain damages for
legislative policy decisions that might be perfectly legal under EU law); Jan
Kleinheisterkam, Financial Responsibility in European International Investment Policy, 63
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 449, 474 (2014) (claiming that an implication of EU agreements being
negotiated in line with existing BITs is that future EU investment treaties will permit arbitral
tribunals to award damages if they find that an EU legislation does not respect the standards
of protection provided by the investment treaty); Matthew C. Porterfield, International
Expropriation Rules and Federalism, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 7 (2004) (stating that the
concern over expansion of property rights under NAFTA led to a provision in the Trade Act
of 2002 that instructs the Office of the United States Trade Representative to ensure that
expropriation provisions in future trade agreements do not provide foreign investors with
greater rights than those provided to property owners under U.S. law); Trevor Zeyl, Charting
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body of research suggests that, at least in some cases, investment
treaties do in fact provide investors greater protections than are available under the law of many developed states, including those that are
often considered to have strong property rights guarantees. 138 Tribunals have, for instance,
• adopted interpretations of the indirect expropriation
standard that are more protective of private property
than standards used in the United States, which has
relatively strong protections against government interference with private property; 139
• provided shareholders greater rights to sue and recover for harm than they are entitled in most countries of
the world with advanced systems of corporate governance; 140
the Wrong Course: The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law, 49
ALTA. L. REV. 203, 234 (2011) (arguing that the requirement of home states to maintain a
predictable and stable legal framework impedes the home state’s regulatory authority and
creates a situation where the home state will be liable for disappointing investor’s legitimate
expectations in almost every case).
138. See Shawn Nichols, Expanding Property Rights under Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS): Class Struggle in the Era of Transnational Capital, 25 REV. INT’L POL.
ECON. 243, 263–64 (2018) (arguing that the definition of property adopted by arbitrators is
far more expansive than that provided for in the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution);
Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 104, at 379–92 (arguing that two investor-state arbitration
awards despite ruling in favor of states provide investors with a roadmap to impede
legitimate IP related regulations); Baker & Geddes, supra note 104, at 512 (arguing that at
least three investor-state dispute cases demonstrate that investor-state arbitrations on
domestic health measures are shrinking the domestic policy space); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Intellectual Property Rights, the Pool of Knowledge, and Innovation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 20014, 2014), available at https://www.nber.org/
papers/w20014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZX7Z-VNWZ]; Lise Johnson et al., Investor-State
Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and U.S. Domestic Law 1, 10 (Colum. Ctr. on
Sustainable Inv. Pol’y Paper, May 2015) (claiming that arbitral tribunals assume the role of
interpreting judicial and administrative principles and as such afford foreign investors
greater rights than are provided by domestic law); David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties
and Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss: Insights from Advanced Systems of Corporate
Law (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 2014/02, 2014), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz0xvgngmr3-en [https://perma.cc/FUL8-ZF4Z].
139. See, e.g., Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Liability and Heads of Loss, ¶¶ 178–80 (Feb. 21, 2017),
available
at
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8487.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J38N-XZQ5] (effectively permitting “conceptual severance” of the
investor’s assets in order to find that there had been an expropriation).
140. See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 138, at 24–26 (arguing that permitting
shareholder’s reflected loss, which are generally barred under national law could result in
transactional structuring to obtain foreign status).
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commonly permitted investors to hold governments to
contracts or representations that are illegal, unauthorized, or otherwise unenforceable under domestic
law; 141
recognized for investors a right to recover compensation for alleged procedural errors in government administrative or judicial decision-making (even in cases
where the investors did not appeal those decisions
domestically, or in cases where they had been appealed and domestic courts found the government’s
conduct was consistent with relevant domestic law). 142

Notably, tribunals have failed to discuss why their relatively
pro-investor approaches on these issues are preferable to the domestic ones from which they depart, except to note that their approaches
are more responsive to the particular interests of international capital. 143 In contrast, the competing approaches in place at the domestic
law level reflect a broader balancing of interests. 144 Again, these issues are important to highlight because, by constraining states’ regulatory powers and narrowing states’ abilities to consider interests that
compete with those of covered investors, IIAs make it more difficult
for states to ensure that FDI aligns with their sustainable development objectives and the needs and interests of other stakeholders.
141. See generally Symposium, A Fundamental Shift in Power: Permitting International
Investors to Convert their Economic Expectations into Rights, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
106 (2018) (discussing the power of investors to bind states to domestically nonbinding
statements made by government officials regarding the investor’s economic rights).
142. See, e.g., Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Ecuador, PCA Case Repository 2012-2, ¶
6.127 (2016) (holding that the respondent did not provide the claimant with any effective
legal or administrative remedy); Gold Reserve Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/09/1, Award, ¶¶ 600–01, 609–15, 848–56 (Sept. 22, 2014), available at
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4009.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EV8H-ZA3T] (finding due process violations in respondent’s treatment of several mining
concessions, and awarding over USD 700 million in damages plus pre- and-post-award
interest, compounded annually); TECO Guat. Holdings LLC v. Republic of Guat., ISCID
Case No. ARB/10/23, Award, ¶¶ 588, 780
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/case-documents/italaw7196.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
PRY8-FYCF] (finding a breach due to the government’s failure to give reasons for not
following a non-binding recommendation) (challenge to the award rejected in Decision on
Annulment, ¶¶ 285–300 (Apr. 5, 2016)).
143. See, e.g., Telefónica SA v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 76–77 (May 25, 2006), 17 ICSID Rep. 3 (2016)
(supporting decision on shareholder’s claims by highlighting that the aim of the treaty is to
protect and promote investment).
144. See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 138, at 26 (discussing relative treatment of policy
issues).
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Additionally, because of the relatively vague nature of many
investment treaty obligations, at least some of the concern about the
impact of investment treaties is not based on the fact that they will result in claims and/or liability for states, but that there is a risk that
they will, and that risk may cause governments to abandon otherwise
legitimate public interest measures taken by the executive or legislative branches. While states may not be equally sensitive to these
risks, some academics have noted that the uncertain content of treaty
obligations and potential for costly claims and liability may be more
likely to have a chilling effect on the actions of government officials
from developing than developed countries given that the former may:
have poorer access to necessary legal expertise to evaluate the merits
of claims/defenses; be more concerned about the possibility of having to pay significant legal fees and a potential award; 145 and be more
concerned about the reputational impacts that a dispute and/or claim
could have.
IIAs also impose other constraints on other domestic policy
preferences. For instance, IIAs have increasingly contained provisions expanding the scope of intellectual property protections beyond
those granted under the treaty parties’ domestic law and entrench
those protections as a matter of international law; 146 they have also
increasingly included provisions that broadly restrain countries’ abilities to use performance requirements to help capture the benefits of
FDI. 147 While potentially helping signal treaty parties’ commitments
to liberal economic policies, each of these categories of provisions
constrain domestic regulatory freedom in ways that can have significant implications for a range of issues, including innovation policy,
competition policy, health care, and equality. 148

145. See, e.g., BONNITCHA, supra note 28, at 120.
146. See, e.g., Susan Sell, Investment, ISDS, and Intellectual Property: 2018, in
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY (Lisa Sachs, Jesse Coleman &
Lise Johnson eds., 2019); Corporate Rent-Seeking, Market Power and Inequality: Time for a
Multilateral Trust Buster?, UNCTAD POL’Y BRIEF, May 16, 2018, at 1, 4 [hereinafter
Corporate Rent-Seeking] (arguing for shift in global antitrust regulations to a more
comprehensive approach to prevent corporate abuses); Pierre Kohler & Francis Cripps, Do
Trade and Investment (Agreements) Foster Development or Inequality? 29–31 (Global Dev.
& Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 18-03, 2018) (demonstrating how corporations can use
IPR laws to shift profits and create monopolistic rents at the expense of public finances).
147. LISE JOHNSON, SPACE FOR LOCAL CONTENT POLICIES AND STRATEGIES: A CRUCIAL
TIME TO REVISIT AN OLD DEBATE 21, 23 (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit 2016).
148. See Sell, supra note 146; Corporate Rent-Seeking, supra note 146, at 4; Kohler &
Cripps, supra note 146, at 31 (arguing that the largest players in international trade and
finance are increasing their weight in rule making, while being less accountable to the
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2. Opportunities to Avoid Unjustified Policy Space Constraints
In light of these issues, governments should assess the potential for IIAs to constrain efforts to achieve the SDGs. One way to
minimize the risk of constraints might be to shift some of the responsibilities and goals of investment treaties (e.g., in terms of policies to
attract, shape, and protect investment) to the realm of domestic law
and policy. Several academics have argued that international investment governance should be guided by the principle of subsidiarity,
which counsels that “issues should be decided only by a higher authority when the objectives of an action cannot be effectively
achieved by a lower authority” because “individual human beings
should be no more separated from decisions that affect them than is
necessary to protect their interests.” 149
While increasing investment flows may be a policy objective
shared among countries internationally, designing the appropriate
frameworks for influencing and governing such flows is generally
best done at more “responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative” levels of government, in line with SDG 16, unless and except where international cooperation is particularly valuable, such as
avoiding races to the bottom, supporting the needs of poorer countries, and overcoming market failures that impede optimal crossborder flows of investments. 150
In order to ensure that IIAs do not frustrate states’ efforts to
develop and implement laws and policies in the public interest, it is
important to carefully shape their substantive obligations accordingly. This necessitates a careful evaluation of:
public); JOHNSON, supra note 147, at 33 (claiming that the tools available to governments to
promote local firms and create linkages with foreign investors has been reducing). See also
Nichols, supra note 138, at 251 (claiming that political and economic elites have, through
arbitration, sought to capture regulation mechanisms by propagating the view that any
regulation which impedes capital accumulation represents expropriation of property);
Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 104, at 393 (highlighting how the threat of ISDS disputes
have led to Togo’s withdrawing its anti-tobacco measures and Colombia not issuing a
compulsory license which would have made leukemia drugs more accessible to patients);
Baker & Geddes, supra note 104, at 512–13 (stating that some ISDS claims reflect the
extraordinary power investors have over domestic IP and health policy); Stiglitz, supra note
138, at 17 (showing that “tighter intellectual property regimes . . . may lead to lower levels
of innovation, and even lower levels of investment in innovation. . . .”).
149. EMMA AISBETT ET AL., RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE:
PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 86 (2018).
150. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, supra note 1, SDG 16, Target 7
(“Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all
levels.”).
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which substantive provisions are included in the treaty, why, and with what implications for which stakeholder groups and for each of the SDGs (e.g., fair and
equitable treatment, full protection and security, nonimpairment, non-discrimination, obligation against unlawful expropriation, free transfer requirements, restrictions on performance requirements, and the umbrella clause); 151
how the provisions are drafted (including the extent to
which they permit unintended/unforeseen interpretations);
whether there are any exceptions that narrow the
scope of the obligations; and
the extent to which ISDS and related provisions leave
governments vulnerable to litigation for an alleged
breach.

It is also critical that the treaty itself, including its dispute settlement provisions, are consistent with accepted rule of law standards
and the commitments under SDG 16. In standard ISDS provisions,
for instance, treaty parties delegate significant decision-making authority to three typically private party-appointed arbitrators who are
not accountable to the public, whose decisions are effectively shielded from review, and who lack the guarantees of independence and
impartiality typically required of judicial officials. 152 Combined with
the opacity of these cases and frequent inability of interested and
even affected individuals and entities to access information about or
participate in the proceedings or their outcomes, these dynamics raise
important questions not only about the effects of IIAs and ISDS on
rule of law at the domestic level, but also whether, as called for by
SDG 16, the ISDS system itself is consistent with the principles of
transparency, certainty, and accountability that the rule of law em-

151. In determining the proper level of investment protection to provide, Bonnitcha has
concluded that “from the perspective of encouraging efficient investment decisions, it is
preferable that investment treaty protections err by under-protecting rather than overprotecting foreign investment.” BONNITCHA, supra note 28, at 77–78.
152. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Peru, art. 8.2(3), Feb. 12, 2018,
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/pafta/full-text/Documents/chapter-8investment.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MXX-Q52Y]; Free Trade Agreement, Sing.-Turk., art.
12.16, Nov. 14, 2015, https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/-/media/esg/files/non-financialassistance/for-companies/free-trade-agreements/TRSFTA/Legal-text/Chapter-12
[https://perma.cc/AC29-WLL9]; Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 27, Nov. 4, 2005, T.I.A.S. No. 06-1101.
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bodies. 153
IV. IIAS AND SDG-ADVANCING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Many of the arguments in this paper have been premised upon
the assumption that increased global capital flows and mobility present both opportunities and risks. Some of these risks are not well
suited to be addressed by countries acting independently. In addition
to their role attracting and channeling sustainable developmentdriving investments and promoting good governance domestically,
IIAs could help to address challenges of investment governance that
may be exacerbated by global corporate actors and their activities,
and collective action problems.
This section briefly highlights the possibilities for enhanced
global governance around these issues. It starts in Part A by examining fiscal, environmental, labor, or other policy “races to the bottom”
in investment attraction and retention policies, and opportunities to
combat those harmful competitions for capital; it then turns in Part B
to explore problems arising from the transnational nature of economic actors that generate complexity for mechanisms of regulation and
enforcement; in Part C, it discusses the need for greater efforts to anticipate, identify and address the effects of IIAs on particular populations or the environment pre- and post-negotiations; and finally, in
Part D, it focuses on the role of IIAs in addressing relevant global
commons challenges that may be affected by the investment activities IIAs seek to promote.
A. Combatting Races to the Bottom
Through their liberalization and free-transfer provisions, IIAs
make it easier for companies not only to expand but also to move
their existing investments across borders. This potentially exacerbates interjurisdictional competitions for capital, which, for example,
can result in pressure on states to offer ever more generous investment incentives. Some limited legal orders have attempted to discipline these costly and undesirable competitions for capital. For instance, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union contains
a robust set of rules preventing, with certain exceptions, EU member
states from offering incentives or “State Aid” to outbid other EU

153. See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
(2007).

AND

PUBLIC LAW 174
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member states in their efforts to attract and keep investment. 154
These rules are also accompanied by transparency requirements and
enforcement mechanisms, including citizen complaint processes,
which aid in the monitoring and implementation of the regime.
While IIAs help promote the mobility of capital, these types of incentive disciplines are still rare in IIAs; 155 thus, the agreements miss a
crucial opportunity to combat costly and often wasteful beggar-thyneighbor incentive schemes that can erode the benefits FDI otherwise
might offer.
A limited number of IIAs include provisions restricting certain types of regulatory incentives in order to prevent governments
from creating races to the bottom by waiving or derogating from existing labor or environmental standards to attract investment. 156 In
addition to these non-derogation provisions, the 2018 renegotiated
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), now known as
the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”), also includes provisions that prohibit treaty parties from failing to enforce anticorruption laws as encouragement for trade and investment. 157
While still relatively rare, these provisions that limit derogation from or lowering of standards are not new and can be found in a
number of other agreements concluded over the past twenty-five
years. But they have been critiqued on the ground that they are never
154. See Philippe Gugler, Incentives in the European Union, in RETHINKING
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES: TRENDS AND POLICY OPTIONS 94, 113–14 (Ana Teresa TavaresLehmann et al. eds., 2016); Lise Johnson, Regulation of Investment Incentives: Instruments
at an International/Supranational Level, in RETHINKING INVESTMENT INCENTIVES: TRENDS
AND POLICY OPTIONS 264, 285–88, 294 (Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann et al. eds., 2016).
155. Some treaties do have relevant provisions in their competition chapters. See Free
Trade Agreement, E.U.-Sing., ch. 12, Oct. 19, 2018, https://www.mti.gov.sg//media/MTI/Microsites/EUSFTA/EUSFTA-Full-Text_12Oct18.pdf [https://perma.cc/93JM3QVP] [hereinafter EU-Singapore FTA]. There are also relevant provisions in recent
agreements’ disciplines on state-owned enterprises that seek to discipline incentives and
other supports for outward investments when those supports result certain adverse effects in
the host economy. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 135, art 17.6.
156. Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, International Investment Agreements, 2013: A Review
of Trends and New Approaches, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW &
POLICY 2013-2014, at 25, 39 (Andrea Bjorklund ed., 2015). Due to a large stock of older and
long-lived IIAs, only a minority of all IIAs in force contain such labor, human rights, or
environmental provisions. Kathryn Gordon et al., Investment Law Sustainable Development
and Responsible Business Conduct: A Fact Finding Survey 5 (OECD Working Papers on
Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 1, 2014).
157. See generally Agreement Between the United States of America, the United
Mexican States, and Canada, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 27, Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreementbetween [https://perma.cc/5G2W-K4EA] [hereinafter USMCA].
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enforced and therefore ineffective. 158 In some treaties (or side
agreements thereto), such as the NAFTA, 159 USMCA, 160 and other
agreements concluded by the United States, private parties are empowered to file complaints alleging breach of some of those nonderogation/non-lowering of standards provisions. Yet even when
private parties have raised allegations of breach through those complaint mechanisms, states—which alone hold the power to formally
raise those issues through the treaty’s formal dispute settlement provisions—have almost always declined to do so: only one labor complaint of the more than 40 raised under NAFTA’s labor side agreement and other U.S. trade agreements has reached the dispute
settlement stage. 161
It is also unclear whether and what impacts labor or environmental law violations must have on trade or investment flows for
those violations to be challenged under a treaty; and if proof of impact is required, what proof will suffice? These issues are relevant
because treaties with such non-derogation or non-lowering-ofstandards clauses often state that, in order to violate the treaty, there
must be some type of connection between the low or lowered standards and trade or investment between the parties. In the lone abovereferenced case that the United States has brought, in this case
against Guatemala, the relevant treaty stated: “A Party shall not fail
to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the
Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.” 162
158. See Franz Christian Ebert & Pedro A. Villarreal, The Renegotiated “NAFTA”:
What Is In It for Labor Rights?, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/therenegotiated-nafta-what-is-in-it-for-labor-rights/ [https://perma.cc/E7QC-N4CW].
159. One of the NAFTA’s side agreements is the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation. Article 14 of that agreement enables citizen submissions
alleging that a NAFTA party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws. North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Sept. 9, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1480, 1483.
160. USMCA, supra note 157, arts. 24.27, 24.28 (governing the citizen submission
process for environmental matters, pursuant to which “[a]ny person of any Party may file a
submission [with the relevant treaty committee] asserting that a Party is failing to effectively
enforce its environmental laws”); id. art. 23.11 (providing, in the labor chapter, that “[e]ach
Party shall . . . provide for the receipt and consideration of written submissions from persons
of a Party on matters related to this Chapter in accordance with its domestic procedures”).
161. Ebert & Villarreal, supra note 158, at 4.
162. See Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, art. 16.2(1)(a),
Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text
[https://perma.cc/B66Y-2Y4A].
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Although the dispute settlement panel constituted to hear the
case found proof of unremedied violations of labor law in Guatemala
at eight worksites and involving dozens of workers, it concluded that
those violations did not breach the relevant treaty because there was
not adequate proof that low and lowered standards were part of a sustained and recurring course of action and conferred a competitive advantage on the violating firms. 163 Signaling the United States’ disagreement with that panel decision, the USMCA contains new
clarifying language to relevant clauses in both the labor and environment chapters giving future claims for breach a better chance of
success. 164
Non-derogation provisions could extend to other standards or
practices, including the protection of human rights, or could be more
widely applied with respect to other areas like corruption, public
health, and other areas of public interest regulation.
In addition to provisions seeking to maintain environmental,
social, and other regulatory standards at a particular floor, some more
recent IIAs include provisions that commit treaty partners to advance
labor standards, human rights, and environmental protection within
their territories, in line with specified international standards. 165 The
USMCA contains provisions requiring Mexico to strengthen protections for freedom of association and collective bargaining in its labor
laws, and to strengthen mechanisms for enforcing those protections. 166 In a first-of-its-kind approach, the USMCA further aims to
combat the downward pressure on wages that capital mobility can
163. In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations Under Article
16.2.1(a) of CAFTA-DR: Final Report of the Panel, ¶ 594 (Arbitral Panel Established
Pursuant to Chapter 20 of CAFTA-DR) (June 14, 2017), available at
https://www.trade.gov/industry/tas/Guatemala%20%20%E2%80%93%20Obligations%20U
nder%20Article%2016-2-1(a)%20of%20the%20CAFTA-DR%20%20June%2014%
202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2HA-495T].
164. USMCA, supra note 157, ch. 23 nn.7–9, ch. 24 nn.3–4.
165. See e.g., EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 155, arts. 12.3(3)–(5) (reaffirming the
parties’ commitments to advancing labor standards and commitments in the respective
countries). See also Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Benin-Can., art. 16, Jan. 9, 2013, available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/
collection_2014/maecd-dfatd/FR4-2014-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KC4-WE9V] (“Each
Contracting Party should encourage enterprises operating within its territory or subject to its
jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate internationally recognized standards of corporate
social responsibility in their practices and internal policies, such as statements of principle
that have been endorsed or are supported by the Contracting Parties. These principles
address issues such as labour, the environment, human rights, community relations and anticorruption.”).
166. USMCA, supra note 157, annex 23-A.
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spur, and raise pay in the auto manufacturing industry in Mexico by
requiring that a certain percentage of a car built in North America be
built by workers earning at least $16 per hour in order to qualify for
the USMCA’s preferential treatment. 167
While there are questions about the practical workability of
the wage-content approach used in the USMCA, its strategy for seeking to raise pay in Mexico’s automobile industry offers an important
precedent for other attempts to establish a floor for corporate conduct
even when such conduct is not required by law. Under this approach,
companies must certify that their products (or a set portion thereof)
meet certain production process standards in order to qualify for duty-free treatment. One could, for instance, envision applying such an
approach with respect to emissions intensity or other GHG-related
criteria in order to minimize problems of carbon leakage.
B. Closing Transnational Governance Gaps
Cross-border activity by MNEs raises important governance
challenges. The tasks of drafting, monitoring, and enforcing laws
regulating MNE conduct are more difficult as firms are structured
across borders as atomized legal entities, each with carefully crafted
holdings of assets and liabilities. Although the design of those corporate legal structures can drive up returns to shareholders and
strengthen MNEs’ competitive positions, they often do so at the expense of others, eroding tax bases, externalizing harms without compensating for losses caused, and unfairly tilting the playing field.
Moreover, while MNEs’ operations spread across borders, the powers of governments and other stakeholders to combat these effects
weaken. Rules on corporate form and jurisdictional boundaries significantly limit the ability of governments and the public to access information about a given company, subject the company to investigation, hold it liable, and/or collect any damages awarded.
Governments have unilaterally and collectively taken some
steps to address these issues. Courts in a few domestic jurisdictions,
for instance, have been somewhat softening the arguably artificial
lines between corporate affiliates, limiting the ability of parent companies to avoid liability for harms caused by the subsidiaries they
own and control. 168 At the multilateral level, governments have been
committing to increase cross-border information-sharing and collabo167. Id. annex 4-B-1-27.
168. Symposium, Transnational Corporate Responsibility in Domestic Courts: Still Out
of Reach?, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 5 (2019).
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ration on taxation of MNEs so as to help prevent companies from using their global networks to evade and avoid taxes. 169 Governments
have also been working together to help understand competition effects of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, enforce their anti-trust
laws and prevent abusive market practices. 170
But much remains to be done. IIAs aiming to increase MNE
activities should play a role, helping to anticipate and monitor the
governance gaps that MNEs fall into (or purposefully exploit), and
supporting collaboration (on a special and differential treatment basis) to close those gaps 171 or remedy their effects. 172 Relevant activities can include technical and financial support, 173 agreements to cooperate on rule-making, monitoring, and enforcement relating to
international corporate activities, and efforts to establish funds and

169. See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 9–10 (2013),
available at https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF5T-H797]
(calling for countries to establish domestic and international legal and administrative
frameworks for exchange of country-by-country reports by multinational enterprises); see
also OECD/G20, BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, TRANSFER PRICING
DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING: ACTION 13: 2015 FINAL REPORT
10 (2015), available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241480en.pdf?expires=1569526881&id=id&accname=ocid177456&checksum=C569710B4BFBFD
AB10B0A658D45D4390 [https://perma.cc/JEP6-AKVR.]. The Inclusive Framework on
BEPS, which seeks to involve countries beyond the G20 and OECD in implementing the
BEPS agenda, requires monitoring and enforcement of certain BEPS minimum standards,
including Action 13. OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: PROGRESS REPORT JULY
2016-JUNE 2017, at 7–10 (2017), available at https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/inclusiveframework-on-BEPS-progress-report-july-2016-june-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZRAYD6R] [hereinafter INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS].
170. John J. Parisi, Cooperation Among Competition Authorities in Merger Regulation,
43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 55, 170 (2010).
171. For some ideas of how to close governance gaps in IIAs to improve corporate
accountability, see generally Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Joe Zhang, Integrating
Investor Obligations and Corporate Accountability Provisions in Trade and Investment
Agreements: Meeting Report, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 2018),
https://www.iisd.org/library/integrating-investor-obligations-and-corporate-accountabilityprovisions-trade [https://perma.cc/B35P-Y4H4]. For a discussion of possibilities for
increased bilateral or multilateral efforts to address anti-trust issues, see, e.g., Corporate
Rent-Seeking, supra note 146, at 4.
172. Alessandra Mistura, Integrating Civil Liability Principles into International
Investment Law: A Solution to Environmental Damage Caused by Foreign Investors?, in
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 446, 481–84 (Lisa Sachs,
Jesse Coleman & Lise Johnson eds., 2019).
173. As noted by the OECD, complying with the BEPS framework requires significant
capacity and resources and can be challenging for developing countries to implement. See
INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS, supra note 169, at 9.
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mechanisms to ensure access to appropriate remedies. 174
C. Anticipating, Understanding, and Addressing Treaty Effects in
State Parties
Given the intention for these treaties to effect changes in investment flows and practices, states should assess the projected environmental, social, economic, and human rights impacts of investment
agreements and the FDI they support, and the factors that make those
impacts more or less likely to occur. While it is crucial to conduct
relevant analyses before negotiating treaties, it is also important to
consider impacts and develop and implement appropriate policy responses over the life of the agreement. 175
For example, when the EU and China commissioned a sustainability impact assessment (SIA) of their potential investment
agreement, they found that, among its potential impacts, the agreement would likely increase EU investment in China’s chemical industry. 176 The study noted that the sector was responsible for significant pollution in China, and that domestic government regulations
had thus far failed to adequately address or remediate environmental
harms from that industry. 177 Increased foreign investment, the SIA
noted, potentially driven by the desire of EU firms to reduce regulatory compliance costs, could exacerbate these challenges. 178 The
SIA, however, then dismissed concerns by noting that this increased
investment would likely improve environmental outcomes because
European firms could be expected to migrate their more sustainable
practices and voluntary codes of responsible business conduct to
China, thus remediating potential negative impacts from increased
investment. 179 But it also noted that a significant share of the chemicals firms operating in China were already foreign-owned, 180 challenging the assumption that increased EU investment would improve
174. Mistura, supra note 172, at 489–90.
175. See Olivier De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Guiding
Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade and Investment Agreements, ¶
2.1, A/HRC/19/59/Add.5 (Dec. 19, 2011).
176. ECORYS NEDERLAND ET AL., SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (SIA) IN
SUPPORT OF AN INVESTMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 173–74, 223 (2017).
177. Id. at 171.
178. See id. at 169 (discussing compliance costs in the EU).
179. Id. at 220, 223.
180. Id. at 172.
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environmental performance. Ultimately, the SIA’s specific recommendations regarding the chemical sector did not address these issues. 181 Similarly, its recommendations regarding environmental and
cross-cutting issues of sustainability highlighted steps the state parties “could” (rather than “should”) take to mitigate negative impacts,
and focused on relatively light-touch solutions such as mechanisms
for voluntary cooperation, dialogue, and information sharing. 182
A robust impact assessment and implementation plan could
further map relevant environmental laws and gaps between EU and
Chinese standards on the books and as enforced, and evaluate motives for EU investors to invest in China (such as to reduce costs of
complying with environmental, health, and safety laws). The agreement could also include relevant action plans, including firm commitments by the EU to provide technical or other supports for its
chemical companies, many of which, the SIA notes, are small- and
medium-sized enterprises, 183 to deploy best available technologies
and practices when investing in China. The treaty could also contain
commitments to cooperate with Chinese officials on development
and enforcement of relevant environmental, health, and safety standards; to share information regarding corporate violators; to develop
complaint mechanisms where employees and citizens could report
violations against firms irrespective of ownership; and to monitor
changes in the industry and its performance on environmental, health
and safety issues.
Some treaties include provisions that commit treaty parties to
cooperate in achieving specified environmental, labor, or other goals,
or in establishing mechanisms or institutions to identify priorities for
future cooperation. 184 The US-Chile FTA, for instance, sets out a list
of priority items for inter-state collaboration. These included capacity building for regulation of industrial use of chemicals and reducing
pollution from mining and agriculture. 185 In connection with the
U.S.-Peru FTA and concerns that the agreement could drive further
illegal logging and trade in endangered species, the state parties con181. Id. at 223–24.
182. Id. at 220–21.
183. Id. at 223–24.
184. See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement art. 17.9,
Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text
[https://perma.cc/5TSQ-XCA7].
185. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Chile-U.S., annex 19.3, June 6, 2003,
42 I.L.M. 1026, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chilefta/final-text [https://perma.cc/UFC5-K2RA].
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cluded an annex on forest governance. 186 Given the breadth of commitments and cooperative activities envisioned in that annex, it was a
groundbreaking initiative that led environmental groups—including
groups that had not previously backed any free trade agreements—to
support conclusion of the U.S.-Peru FTA.
Some treaties further provide for the developed country partner to provide assistance to the less developed country partner in
achieving environmental, social, or other objectives. 187 In connection
with the U.S.-CAFTA-DR, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency provided assistance to El Salvador on a range of environmental issues, including setting standards for lead contamination, establishing
a national water quality reference laboratory, establishing government units for investigation and enforcement of environmental laws,
and establishing environmental tribunals. 188
However, even relatively strong environmental and labor provisions in these agreements have had disappointing results. 189 Studies, including government audits of these provisions, have found that
their promise has not been fulfilled. Cited causes include: targets
and commitments are not clearly stated; priorities tend to shift away
from labor and environmental issues over time after the agreements
are concluded and ratified; treaties often exclude relevant environmental and labor provisions from dispute settlement under the treaty
and, when formal dispute settlement is available to enforce environmental and labor commitments, states appear extremely reluctant to
use them; and finally, stakeholder complaint mechanisms are rarely
186. United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Peru-U.S., annex 18.3.4, Feb. 1, 2009,
available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text
[https://perma.cc/XT4N-SJPX].
187. See e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the States of the European Free Trade
Association (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) and the Central American
States, art. 9.1, June 24, 2013, available at http://www.efta.int/free-trade/free-tradeagreements/central-american-states [https://perma.cc/3H3T-PNB3].
188. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 111; United States Government
Accountability Office [USGAO], Free Trade Agreements: Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative Should Continue to Improve Its Monitoring of Environmental Commitments,
at 6, 9–10, 14–16, 22 (Report to Congressional Requesters, Nov. 2014), available at
www.gao.gov/assets/670/666782.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C3D-EVSF].
189. See, e.g., USGAO, Free Trade Agreements: U.S. Partners Are Addressing Labor
Commitments, but More Monitoring and Enforcement Are Needed, at 23, 27–29, 46 (Report
to Congressional Requesters, Nov. 2014), available at www.gao.gov/assets/670/666787.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XMP7-SH4S]; USGAO, Four Free Trade Agreements GAO Reviewed
Have Resulted in Commercial Benefits, but Challenges on Labor and Environment Remain,
at 58–60, 68–69 (Report to the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, July 2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09439.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7LA-HM7F].
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included in agreements, and when they are included, stakeholders are
inadequately informed of or responded to in the complaint process.
A large and growing body of literature can help states avoid
repeating mistakes in IIA design and implementation, and better ensure those treaties support sustainable development outcomes. However, environmental and social impact assessments, even when conducted, still have room for improvement; the SDGs provide a useful
set of issues, targets, and indicators to incorporate into more robust
assessments.
D. Addressing Relevant Global Commons Challenges
IIAs could also be mobilized to tackle global commons challenges, in which individual states have incentives to consume rivalrous and non-excludable common goods unsustainably. International
cooperation, including in relation to economic policy, is necessary in
these arenas to promote more sustainable production and consumption to the benefit of all countries.
Climate change is likely the most pressing and prototypical,
though surely not the only, commons problem faced today. Specifically, the amount of carbon that can be released into the atmosphere
before exceeding the 2oC warming target agreed to in the Paris
Agreement can be considered a common pool resource, where each
state has an incentive to consume as much as possible to the detriment of collective action to transition to a low-carbon society. For
this reason, international cooperation on climate change has been
seen to be crucial to adoption of state-level mitigation plans. 190
While some international agreements on climate change exist, 191 these agreements have as yet remained insufficient to put the
planet on a 2oC path. 192 IIAs therefore could provide complementary
instruments to support responsible action on climate change by
providing carrots to encourage investments that support mitigation
190. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Anthony L. I. Moffa, Why Climate Change Collective
Action Has Failed and What Needs to be Done Within and Without the Trade Regime, 15 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 777, 785–86 (2012).
191. See, e.g., Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015), in UNFCCC, COP Report No. 21,
Addendum, at 21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add, 1 (Jan. 29, 2016), available at
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Q89X4BR] [hereinafter Paris Agreement]; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
192. Joeri Rogeli et al., Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need A Boost to Keep
Warming Well Below 2°C, 534 NATURE 631, 637 (2016).
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goals—targeted supports (financial, technical, or otherwise) for energy or forest conservation or clean energy investment, for instance—
as well as sticks to discipline continued fossil fuel dependence.
Mounting research has chronicled the challenges that IIAs
could pose for climate change. These include: generating increased
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions due to increased overall economic activity, transit of goods, and liberalization of restrictions on export of fossil fuels. 193 Additionally, experts have highlighted that
trade and investment disciplines may make it harder for governments
to adopt and maintain climate friendly policies. Restrictions on local
content requirements, for example, may prevent governments from
using tools that can be crucial for securing political buy-in for renewable energy projects; 194 other treaty provisions can be used to challenge climate change measures such as restrictions on new fossil
fuel-exploration or exploitation projects, or phase out of fossil-fuelbased infrastructure. 195 While commenters have highlighted these
potential tensions, official state reviews of IIAs frequently fail to assess and address them. 196
But treaties could be designed differently. Apart from ensuring that disciplines do not unduly constrain climate policies, 197 IIAs
could impose affirmative obligations to: cooperate on identifying
opportunities for investment in clean technologies; provide, on a special and differential treatment basis, support for qualifying projects;
reinforce or integrate commitments under climate change agreements; and mandate corporate disclosures of GHGs, including GHGs
from outward FDI.
Additionally, IIAs could require governments to provide in193. Matthew C. Porterfield et al., Assessing the Climate Impacts of U.S. Trade
Agreements, 7 MICH. J. ENVTL. ADMIN. L. 51, 53, 58–59, 79 (2017).
194. Todd Tucker, There’s a Big New Headache for the Green New Deal, WASH. POST,
(June 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/28/theres-big-newheadache-green-new-deal/ [https://perma.cc/3FBH-FRWX].
195. Id.; Nathan Lobel & Matteo Fermeglia, Investment Protection and ‘Unburnable’
Carbon: Competing Commitments in International Investment and Climate Governance, 4
DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO INTERNAZIONALE 945, 959–62 (2018); Lise Johnson, International
Investment Agreements and Climate Change the Potential for Investor-State Conflicts and
Possible Strategies for Minimizing It, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11147, 11149 (2009).
196. Porterfield et al., supra note 193, at 54–57.
197. James Bacchus, The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver, CTR. FOR INT’L
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION SPECIAL REPORT 2, 5, 21 (2017), available at
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/NEWEST%20Climate%20Waiver
%20-%20Bacchus.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YN4-ZPF2]; Gus van Harten, An ISDS Carve-Out
to Support Action on Climate Change 3–4 (Osgoode Hall Law School, York Univ., Research
Paper No. 38/2015, Sept. 20, 2015).
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formation on, and commit to reduce, fossil fuel subsidies. Article
12.11 of the EU-Singapore FTA’s trade and sustainable development
chapter includes some relevant language—discouraging (albeit weakly) fossil fuel subsidies, while also encouraging investment to promote a shift to a low-carbon economy. 198 It states: “the Parties share
the goal of progressively reducing subsidies for fossil fuels. . . . In
addition, both Parties will actively promote the development of a sustainable and safe low-carbon economy, such as investment in renewable energies and energy efficient solutions.” 199
IIAs can also be used to meet objectives regarding technology
transfer. In Article 66.2 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPs Agreement”), for example, “[d]eveloped country Members” committed to “provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose
of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed
country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.” Similarly, parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention for Climate Change agreed in 1992 that the
“developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in
Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally
sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country parties.” 200 IIAs could include language implementing these commitments. But to the extent IIAs have included
provisions on technology transfer, those provisions have tended to
constrain, rather than expand, government policies to drive such
transfer. 201
198. EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 155, art. 12.11.
199. Id. art. 12.11(3).
200. UNFCCC & U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, CLIMATE CHANGE:
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 2 (2008). Similarly, in 1997,
signatories of the Kyoto Protocol affirmed that all Parties “taking into account their common
but differentiated responsibilities” must “[c]ooperate in the promotion of effective modalities
for the development, application and diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote,
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound
technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate change, in particular
to developing countries, including the formulation of policies and programmes for the
effective transfer of environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the
public domain and the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote
and enhance the transfer of, and access to, environmentally sound technologies.” Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 191, art. 10(c).
201. Martin D. Brauch et al., Treaty on Sustainable Investment for Climate Change
Mitigation and Adaptation: Aligning International Investment Law with the Urgent Need for
Climate Change Action, 36 J. INT’L ARB. 7, 15–16 (2019).
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CONCLUSION
Revisiting IIA design in light of the SDGs requires a thorough
evaluation and retooling of investment governance, with countries
conducting robust assessments of the domestic and international objectives and impacts of investment treaties, and taking relevant steps
to bring treaties more in line with 21st Century goals. This is ever
more important in light of the real need for international cooperation
and coordination to address a number of challenges in our increasingly globalized world, and the potential for international investment
governance to fill that gap.
Aligning existing treaties with the SDGs raises different opportunities and challenges than designing future treaties. For new
treaties, countries have the freedom to craft new provisions, exclude
more traditional clauses, and narrow or exclude ISDS. Bringing old
treaties in line with current priorities, in contrast, can require termination, renegotiation, and/or interpretive clarification through exchange
of diplomatic notes or other channels. 202 But for both existing and
future treaties, some action can also be taken at the purely domestic
level through, for example, conditioning treaty benefits on meeting
certain obligations or criteria. Although addressing both existing and
future treaties increases the complexity of a government’s task, policy coherence and effectiveness require a backward look at the large
stock of treaties already in force and a forward look at the agreements
that may be concluded in the future.
This paper advocates key considerations to better align IIAs
202. See, e.g., Lise Johnson, Ripe for Refinement: The State’s Role in Interpretation of
FET, MFN, and Shareholder Rights 21–23 (Oxford Global Econ. Governance Programme,
Working Paper 2015/101, Apr. 2015); Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties
Over Time – Treaty Interpretation in a Changing World 16–39 (OECD Working Papers on
Int’l Inv., Working Paper No. 2015/02, 2015); Lise Johnson & Merim Razbaeva, State
Control over Interpretation of Investment Treaties 3–15 (Colum. Ctr. on Sustainable Inv.
Pol’y Paper, 2014); Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty
Interpretation: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 207–15 (2010). But see
Tarald Laudal Berge, Dispute by Design? Legalisation, Backlash and the Drafting of
Investment Agreements 6–7 (Univ. of Oslo Dept. of Pol. Sci., June 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3201306
[https://perma.cc/U66ZHKCL] (noting that “a new strand of research points to the fact that arbitrators so far have
been ‘insufficiently sensitive to treaty design differences when applying precedent’ and as
such ‘risk rolling back state-driven innovations as new treaties are read in light of old case
law.’ As such, it calls into question whether re-negotiation really matters in a regime where
arbitrators interpret unlike IIAs alike.”) (quoting Wolfgang Alschner, Changing Treaties,
Changing Jurisprudence? The Impact of Treaty Design Differences on Precedential
Reasoning in Investment Arbitration 1 (working paper) (presented at the iCourts conference
on Investment Courts: Challenges and Perspectives, Copenhagen, 2018)).
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with the SDGs. Notably, however, IIAs are only one feature of the
broader governance framework—at the national and international
level—that impacts investment and investment outcomes. Future
scholarship and public debate should continue to consider how states
might redesign global investment governance and its various dimensions—including, but not limited to, the role of international agreements on investment—to address current challenges and goals, as
well as the role of international institutions in facilitating such reform.

